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ABSTRACT
Sensors are used in multiple applications that touch our lives and have become
an integral part of modern life. They are used in building intelligent control systems
in various industries like healthcare, transportation, consumer electronics, military,
etc. Many mission-critical applications require sensor data to be secure and authen-
tic. Sensor data security can be achieved using traditional solutions like cryptography
and digital signatures, but these techniques are computationally intensive and cannot
be easily applied to resource constrained systems. Low complexity data hiding tech-
niques, on the contrary, are easy to implement and do not need substantial processing
power or memory. In this applied research, we use and configure the established low
complexity data hiding techniques from the multimedia forensics domain. These
techniques are used to secure the sensor data transmissions in resource constrained
and real-time environments such as an autonomous vehicle. We identify the areas in
an autonomous vehicle that require sensor data integrity and propose suitable water-
marking techniques to verify the integrity of the data and evaluate the performance of
the proposed method against different attack vectors. In our proposed method, sen-
sor data is embedded with application specific metadata and this process introduces
some distortion. We analyze this embedding induced distortion and its impact on the
overall sensor data quality to conclude that watermarking techniques, when properly






In the modern world, sensors and sensor networks are used in many mission-critical
applications. Different applications such as industrial control systems, healthcare,
military, intelligent transportation, IoT (smart homes, smart infrastructure), etc. use
sensors and rely on their data. Sensors measure the physical quantities from their
environment and often convert them into measurable electric signals (Shin et al.,
2016).
Industrial and infrastructure control systems rely on sensors and computer-based
systems to monitor the physical processes. These systems, also known as process
control systems, are used to connect the networked IT infrastructure to the physical
world through sensors. These Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems or the Cyber-physical Systems (CPS) with the embedded sensor and actuator
networks control several safety-critical applications. SCADA systems, in particular,
perform vital functions in national critical infrastructures, such as electric power
distribution, oil, and natural gas distribution, water and waste-water treatment, and
transportation systems. These control applications can be considered safety-critical
since their failure can cause harm to the physical system and even to the people who
depend on those services (Cárdenas et al., 2011). The security of these safety-critical
1
systems depends on the integrity of the data sensed and transmitted by the sensors.
These industrial control systems have to deal with many legacy components and
interfaces where it becomes challenging to secure all the weak links. Many lightweight
cryptographic mechanisms like IEEE P1711 standard to secure legacy serial links were
developed to ensure data integrity and confidentiality in these systems, yet, studies
show that to secure the critical control systems properly, the underlying technology
must satisfy some minimum performance requirements to allow the implementation of
well-tested security mechanisms and standards. In the absence of such infrastructure,
alternate technologies like watermarking- based sensor security methods need to be
researched. With the recent advances in IoT, wireless sensor networks, and their
penetration into industrial applications, the problem to check for sensor data integrity
becomes more crucial and challenging.
In the recent episode of the theft of RQ-170 Sentinel UAV (unmanned aerial
vehicle), one of the popular theories on the technology behind this controversial theft
emphasizes the importance of checking for sensor data integrity. As per this theory,
the UAV was spoofed to land into an enemy airfield through a GPS spoof attack,
where-in a GPS satellite signal is overlaid by a spoofed GPS signal from a local
transmitter, which lead to the errors in position estimation of the UAV (Hartmann
and Steup, 2013).
Body sensor networks (BSN) is a recent advancement in healthcare management
that relies on the power of the internet of things (IoT) to bring the patients closer
to physicians. BSN lets physicians collect data round the clock from the patient
using low-power and lightweight wireless sensors that monitor the patient and his
environment. These networks are widely used in senior citizen healthcare, where
many sensors wearable, implanted, and environment are used to enable aged people
to enjoy new medical healthcare services ubiquitously. The data collected over these
networks is sensitive both from the privacy and integrity perspectives. Since this data
2
collection does not take place in a controlled environment, the process needs strict
security mechanisms to prevent any malicious attacks in the form of data tampering.
Data integrity is one of the key elements along with the privacy, authentication, and
anonymity of BSNs. Data integrity can be defined as protecting data from external
modifications. In the case of a BSN or any sensor network, an adversary can always
alter the data by adding some fragments or by manipulating the data within a packet.
In the case of life-critical applications, the lack of a mechanism to detect this data
manipulation could become dangerous (Gope and Hwang, 2016).
Figure 1.1: Autonomous vehicle sensor suite (Snehaprabha and Ram, 2019)
An autonomous vehicle or a self-driving car is a disruptive technology altering
the future of ground transportation. As per the European Commission report in
2017, the revenues from autonomous driving are expected to increase from 7.6 bn in
2015 to 50 bn EUR in 2022 (European Commission, 2017). Modern car as a cyber-
physical system heavily relies on sensors. Starting from the biometric sensors like
fingerprints scanners, voice recognition sensors (microphones) that give the user access
to a vehicle to the sensors which help autonomous vehicles drive by themselves like
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LiDARS, RADARs, cameras, and ultrasonic sensors, etc. a modern car relies heavily
on the sensor data. There are five essential functions that an autonomous car needs:
perception, localization, planning, control, and system management. Perception is
the process of sensing the surrounding environment of a vehicle(Jo et al., 2014). The
typical sensor suite used to build the perception layer in an autonomous vehicle is
depicted in Figure 1.1. The most commonly used sensors are cameras, RADAR,
ultrasonic sensors, and LiDAR. The main challenge with the current sensor suite of
an autonomous car is that every sensor has its own deficiency. Some work better in
different weather conditions like rain and snow, and others work better in different
lighting conditions. If each sensor is considered individually, it cannot cover the wide
spectrum of vehicle operating conditions and environments. For example, cameras
can be spoofed by glare, RADARs have a very narrow field of view, ultrasonic sensors
can be only used for near field detections, and LiDARs cannot work well in rainy
conditions. Hence, the concept of sensor fusion is developed where the perception layer
is generated after combining multiple sensor outputs. As the concept of autonomous
vehicles is getting close to reality, engineers are in a quest to make their systems more
safe and secure and in search of new sensors like infrared cameras, ground-penetrating
RADARs (Quain, 2019). This dependency of an autonomous vehicle on sensors and
their data puts forward the challenge of data integrity and brings us to the question of
whether this sensor data is intact while passing through a vehicle network. Given any
application domain discussed above, to ensure the correct operation of the actuation
and control systems that depend on the sensors their data must be authentic and
robust to spoofing.
1.2 Attacks on Sensors
Sensor data spoofing can be broadly classified into three categories (Shin et al.,
2016)
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1. Regular channel: Direct attacks on the physical sensing structure, such as 
spoofing a microphone using a sound wave (Shin et al., 2016). Jamming attack on 
an ultrasonic sensor using an ultrasound generator operating in the same 
frequency as the sensor (Chen et al., 2016).
2. Transmission channel: Attacks on the sensor output transmission channels 
(wired/wireless), such as frame tampering of LiDAR sensor data (Changalvala 
and Malik, 2019b).
3. Side channel: Attacks on the sensing structure by using a different physical 
system, such as using light to inject malicious attacks on the voice-controlled 
devices (Sugawara et al., 2020).
In many modern and legacy systems, having end-to-end security of sensor data from
these three kinds of attacks is very crucial. In an era where smart devices powered by
sensor data are driving our cars, influencing our purchase decisions, automating our
homes, and providing us with continuous connectivity, the need to secure the sensor
data takes higher priority. This need of the day has been a major motivation factor in
our research. In this research, we focus on securing sensor data from the transmission
and regular channel attacks in resource-constrained systems such as an autonomous
vehicle. In the future, it can be extended to a broader scope of end-to-end data
transaction security in autonomous vehicles and other domains.
1.2.1 Automotive Sensors Vulnerability
In the last 20 years, the automotive industry has seen rapid growth in the usage of
electronic control units (ECUs) to implement various technology features such as dy-
namic vehicle controls, infotainment, and ADAS. These technologically enhanced user
experience and safety features are heavily dependent on the sensors, and advanced
communication networks integrated into the vehicles. An autonomous vehicle (AV),
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in particular, depends heavily on sensors and data transmission networks to imple-
ment the highly automated driving functions (Sarmento et al., 2017). Autonomous
vehicles rely entirely on sensors to estimate their surroundings, to detect and react
to obstacles. To achieve a sustainable Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) level 2
automation and above (SAE Ground Vehicle Standard), a typical vehicle is equipped
with multiple sets of sensors, like cameras, LiDARs, and RADARs, etc. To get a per-
spective, the GM Cruise AV is equipped with 5 LiDARs, 16 cameras, and 21 RADAR
sensors (Baxter et al., 2018). An autonomous vehicle internal communication net-
work is widespread and relies on multiple physical interfaces such as Controller Area
Network (CAN), CAN-Flexible Data rate (CAN-FD), Ethernet, Local Interconnect
Network (LIN), FlexRay, etc. These in-vehicle networks are interconnected over gate-
way modules transmitting data and control commands. The sensor data flows through
the vehicle network to the centralized data processing unit called the Advanced Driver
Assistance System (ADAS) module or the vehicle’s brain from the sensors mounted
on the vehicle.
The vehicle internal network topology, which consists of ECUs, gateways that for-
ward data from one interface to other, and the connectivity to the external world over
cellular and other wireless interfaces make a modern vehicle a cyber-physical system
vulnerable to cyber attacks (Cui et al., 2018). In this distributed architecture, it is
possible to inject code through available attack surfaces like the onboard diagnostics
port (OBD-II) and CAN bus into the core ECU and bridge across multiple networks,
thus exposing attack surfaces on different networks.
Numerous attack vectors have been proposed in detail for the CAN and the OBD-
II port over the past decade. It was demonstrated that attackers can infiltrate any
ECU and circumvent safety measures to modify the outcome of safety-critical systems,
disable brakes, perform steering control, or cause faulty cluster displays and even a
complete engine shutdown (Checkoway et al., 2011). The shortcomings in the CAN
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protocol such as the broadcast message format, clear data transfers, and lack of 
mechanisms to establish data authentication and confidentiality, expose the CAN 
network and the nodes connected, such as sensors to masquerade attacks, replay 
attacks, and other exploits (Lin and Sangiovanni-Vincentelli, 2012).
In a connected vehicle, attacks could be launched over wireless channels without 
physical access to the vehicle (Wyglinski et al., 2013). In-vehicle sensor data commu-
nication is unencrypted, and therefore an attacker just needs access to the in-vehicle 
network for sensor data manipulation, which can be realized through available attack 
surfaces. Hackers can exploit these attack surfaces for sensor data manipulation. In a 
given vehicle with autonomy levels higher than SAE level 2 (semi-autonomous mode), 
a cyber-attack on the sensor data could lead to life-threatening accidents as the driver 
would be disengaged partially or completely trusting the system (Liu et al., 2017). 
Consider the example of an Ultrasonic sensor. These sensors are most commonly used 
in modern vehicles for close-range object detections and park assist features. Tesla 
Model S relies on ultrasonic sensors to achieve its “Smart Summon” feature. When 
an ultrasonic sensor is attacked employing jamming and spoofing, it can perceive an 
object that is not truly there (false positive), or cause the sensor not to perceive 
an object that truly is there (false negative) as shown in (Xu et al., 2018). These 
incorrect readings can cause damage to a vehicle, building, or even human life. It 
has been successfully demonstrated in (Chen et al., 2016) that these sensors 
are vulnerable to attack and can have fatal outcomes. Hence, securing sensor 
data transmissions becomes a very critical component for the safe functioning 
of an autonomous vehicle (Longxiang et al., 2017).
1.2.2 Automotive Sensor Categories
Autonomous vehicle sensors are broadly divided into two categories as smart and 
raw sensors based on their data processing capacity. Raw sensors are the ones that
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Figure 1.2: Autonomous vehicle sensor suite - Raw sensor
transmit the raw or unprocessed data to the processing unit inside the vehicle. Shown
in Figure 1.2 is a high-level illustration of (a) data flow from various raw sensors to
the sensor fusion core residing in a vehicle, also known as ADAS (advanced driver
assistance system), and (b) available attack surfaces. For instance, a LiDAR sensor
mounted on the vehicle sends a raw point cloud of the tracked environment over an
Ethernet/LVDS link to the sensor fusion ADAS core ECU placed in the vehicle. Inside
the sensor fusion core, the object information from the raw sensor data is extracted
and a list of tracked-objects called tracklets is computed and provided as an input
to the perception estimator and other applications like the vehicle localizer. The raw
sensors, specifically the ones that have high data rates such as the camera and LiDAR
use the Ethernet interface for their data transmissions to the ADAS unit. Smart
sensors are the ones that can detect and track objects internally, send the tracked
object list to the vehicle over limited bandwidth interfaces such as CAN/CAN-FD.
Figure 1.3 shows data flow from smart sensors to the sensor fusion core residing in
a vehicle and the available attack surfaces. For instance, a RADAR smart sensor
mounted on the vehicle tracks the targets and extracts the object information from
the raw sensor data to build a list of tracklets. This information is provided over the
low bandwidth interfaces like CAN/ CAN-FD to a perception estimator and other
applications running inside the ADAS unit. The majority of RADAR and Camera
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sensor sets used in autonomous vehicles are smart sensors. The data from these
smart sensors is fused inside the vehicle ADAS unit to determine the final list of
surrounding objects (Jo et al., 2015). The decision to select a smart sensor over a
raw sensor is driven by the autonomous vehicle architecture, functional safety and
redundancy requirements. In most architectures, a combination of both types of
sensors is considered.
Figure 1.3: Autonomous vehicle sensor suite - Smart sensor
1.3 Problem Statement
Like any other cyber-physical system, an autonomous vehicle is vulnerable to inter-
nal attacks on the sensor networks. The 2015 Jeep hack by Miller and Valasek where
they could bring the vehicle to ditch through a remote connection highlights the risk
of cyber attacks on modern connected vehicles. The impact of such attacks is more
in vehicles supporting driver assistance and automated driving features. Hackers can
take advantage of the feature implementation flaws, code bugs, etc. to launch remote
or insider attacks. Imagine a typical ride-share application use case of an autonomous
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car, hackers have a direct access to the vehicle during the ride without any human
supervision, giving them ample time to meddle with the system and sensors. It is a
need of the hour to double-check the integrity of the sensor data in autonomous ve-
hicles before processing and acting on it. But, before searching for options to protect
the sensor data, let us first take a look at some of the constraints of the automo-
tive sensor networks. This will help us to come up with practically implementable
solutions. Sensor networks in autonomous vehicles have two constraints.
1. Limited bandwidth: The communication interface from the sensor to the
data processing unit is bandwidth limited in automotive applications. Most
sensors use a traditional CAN interface with an 8-byte payload, which restricts
the usage of traditional cryptographic methods to secure the sensor data (Zou
et al., 2017). An enhanced version of CAN called CANFD is introduced to
increase bandwidth and payload to up to 64 bytes. CANFD allows AUTOSAR
secure onboard communication protocol (SecOC) implementation on the net-
work. Apart from issues like key management, time synchronization, the SecOC
requires the transmission of a message authentication code (MAC), which can
take up to 8 bytes of the payload space. Given a scenario where multiple sen-
sors are connected to the same network and increasing demand on the sensors to
publish more data to build a high-resolution perception, bandwidth can become
a constraint even in high throughput interfaces like CANFD.
2. Real-time data inference: Autonomous vehicle applications often require the
sensor data to be processed in real-time. This constraint makes it difficult to
use traditional data security methods based on cryptography as they require an
additional step of decryption before data becomes useful.
With these two constraints in mind, to design a framework that can work better under
these conditions, we researched the state-of-the-art in sensor data integrity verification
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methods. In our study, we identified that wireless sensor networks (WSN) share
similar constraints as autonomous vehicle sensor networks preventing them from using
any traditional cryptography methods and significant research was done on securing
the data transfers in WSN using watermarking methods. Hence, in our literature
review, we focused on understanding the state-of-the-art watermarking techniques
implemented in wireless sensor networks.
WSNs are extensively used in many fields like environmental monitoring, military
surveillance, traffic monitoring, patient monitoring, etc. In WSNs, the underlying
assumption is that the sensor nodes collect information and send it to a central node
for processing over a wireless interface. WSNs have some typical characteristics when
compared to other traditional networks. They do not care about the origin of the
data. Their primary focus is to collect perception data and to transmit it to the
destination. The sensor leaf nodes are typically low capacity lightweight processing
units, and the networks reconfigure dynamically based on the sensing environmental
conditions. This limitation creates a challenge to design a security mechanism that
is both secure and energy-efficient. The dynamic nature of these networks makes
them susceptible to adversary attacks such as data tampering, forgery, selective for-
warding, replay, and transfer delay attacks (Zhang et al., 2017). The biggest problem
these networks face is how to secure the data without increasing the burden on the
leaf nodes as they are usually resource-constrained. Traditional data integrity au-
thentication methods such as cryptography and message authentication code (MAC)
cannot be applied to these networks. Encryption algorithms require additional key
storage space and computation power which in-turn increase the energy consumption
and storage requirements of the sensor leaf node. Also, though the encrypted data is
safe, the data can only be used after decryption, and the decrypted data could again
become a target of attackers. To solve these issues with traditional methods, several
watermarking techniques were researched for WSN applications. Using watermarking
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for sensor integrity checks started in 2003 with the Feng et al. (Feng and Potkonjak,
2003) proposal of embedding cryptographically encoded signatures into the data pay-
load. From the literature review, it is evident that the watermarking techniques were
applied to wireless sensor networks with applications in IoT and healthcare, etc. To
the best of our knowledge, watermark generation based on the sensor data character-
istics and applying it to check the data integrity in resource-constrained and real-time
sensor networks of an autonomous vehicle is the first of its kind effort. This is the
primary focus area of our research. We want to identify and analyze applications
where the data hiding techniques could be of help in the autonomous vehicle domain.
Figure 1.4: Comparison of different methods to achieve sensor data integrity
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1.4 Watermarking Advantages
In this digital age, with the growing trend of multimedia information exchange,
the need to ensure data confidentiality and integrity is increasing. Data transfers over
different networks are vulnerable to various attacks such as privacy infringement, con-
tent stealing, and tampering. The concept of network information security deals with
securing the data transmissions, storage, and processing from data leakage, theft,
tampering, and deletion. To ensure the network information security, traditionally
cryptography based methods were used. Cryptography ensures communication pri-
vacy, data confidentiality, and authentication by encrypting the data using different
key sharing mechanisms. Though cryptography can be used to solve information se-
curity issue, there are some shortcomings to that approach. Encryption can draw
the attacker’s attention towards sensitive information and motivate them to crack it.
Once the attackers break the encryption, they have complete access to the data. Even
if the attacker fails to crack the encryption, he can slightly modify the data to make
the entire transaction invalid. Data-hiding-based watermarking techniques started
gaining attention over the past two decades particularly in the areas that require the
prevention of unauthorized access to confidential information. These methods do not
reveal their existence in the data, thus providing more protection than cryptography
in some applications. Data hiding methods also differ from traditional cryptography
in their purpose. The main objective of data hiding is not to restrict normal access
to the data but to ensure that the embedded secret information is not violated or dis-
covered (Lu and Guo, 2017). This embedded message can be used to track the data
forgery through different data transactions and also to localize it. The cryptography
methods are usually complex and computation resource-hungry, hence they cannot
be applied every-where. In the edge computing devices such as an autonomous ve-
hicle, where the computation resources are a big constrain, cryptography methods
cannot be applied. There are also other significant drawbacks of using cryptography
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methods in edge systems, like key management burden, network bandwidth issues,
and export restrictions on the products using specific cryptography methods. These
complexities increase both the production and maintenance costs of the features and
products. In an autonomous vehicle, consider a scenario where a couple of satellite
RADARs are connected over a CAN network to a decision-making unit that does
the sensor data fusion to implement an ADAS feature. To implement sensor data in-
tegrity verification using traditional cryptography techniques requires modifying each
smart RADAR sensor to include a hardware trust anchor to store the keys and ac-
celerators to verify the signatures. This increases the RADAR product cost and any
MAC-based security mechanism will also increase the payload overhead, therefore re-
quiring a different interface other than CAN that supports higher bandwidth, which
again is not feasible in legacy systems.
In comparison to conventional cryptography, watermarking methods are compu-
tationally less complex and less resource hungry. Data modified by the watermarking
algorithms can be directly used by the end application without having to modify
or to clean it before usage. This comes as an advantage for applications that rely
on real-time data processing. In Figure 1.4, different methods that can be used to
protect and verify the data integrity in an AV are compared. In a sender-receiver sce-
nario, to protect the data integrity, one can use either encryption, MAC embedding,
or watermarking. In both encryption and MAC-based methods on the receiver end,
applications cannot use data until it is decrypted or the MAC is removed. This ad-
ditional computational step can become a bottleneck in the applications that require
real-time data processing (Changalvala and Malik, 2019b). In such applications, a
cryptographic encryption step would make the data useless until the data gets de-
crypted, adding to the processing delays.
In MAC-based methods, the data payload increases dramatically based on the
interface bandwidth. In most of the legacy systems discussed in section 1.1, the
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bandwidth of the interface between the sensor system and the data processing unit
is a severe bottleneck. This is one of the reasons why the automotive industry was
not able to implement any cryptography over the controller area network (CAN)
interface (Zou et al., 2017). For CAN interface in particular, this method is not
recommended as it could double bandwidth requirements (Woo et al., 2016), (Zou
et al., 2017). Data hiding based watermarking works directly on the host data by
perturbing the data by a negligible amount, thus eliminating the need to increase
the data payload and network bandwidth. As shown in Figure 1.4, all the three
methods have a data integrity verification step in common that can be separated as
an independent process and run in parallel to the algorithms that process the data.
Again, in the case of watermarking, this data verification step does not require much
computation resources, unlike cryptography.
Watermarking also provides much-needed data traceability. The security offered
by watermarking does not stop at the application level. Watermarked data provides
security beyond the autonomous driving application since the data cannot be stripped
of any additional payload. The embedded watermark stays with the data until the
information is used by the consumer application and beyond. Applications acting as a
pass-through to the data such as an on-board data recorder as-well-as secure logging
mechanisms that push the sensor data to the cloud for analytics can benefit from
the watermarking of the data, this concept is discussed further in chapter 6. When
data gets exchanged from one entity to another and security keys are shared, end to
end encryption does not help in identifying the leakage points whereas watermarking
can. These advantages make data-hiding based watermarking techniques a better
choice over cryptography in many edge computing applications such as sensor data
integrity verification in autonomous vehicles. One aspect to consider while using the
data hiding or watermarking techniques is the embedding induced distortion. These
techniques cannot be blindly applied to applications where the accuracy of the data
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is critical over integrity. The embedding included distortion and its impact on the
application need to be studied and watermarking intensity need to be adjusted to fit
a specific application.
1.5 Thesis Outline
In this research, we propose a framework to implement data integrity verification
in autonomous vehicle networks using watermarking techniques. Our research aims
to
1. Identify the applications that are vulnerable to cyber attacks due
to lack of sensor data integrity checks: Analyze the security risks in au-
tonomous vehicle applications in particular. Here, two types of applications are
targeted
• Resource constrained applications: Bandwidth and power-constrained
Autonomous vehicle use case: Securing RADAR tracklet data trans-
mitted over CAN network (Nabati and Qi, 2019), (Changalvala et al.,
2020),
• Time constrainted applications: Real-time data processing
Autonomous vehicle use case: LiDAR sensor raw data object detection
and recognition (Changalvala and Malik, 2019b), (Changalvala and Malik,
2019a)
2. Propose a watermarking or data hiding based solution: Identify data
hiding based watermarking solution to the problem at hand. Suggest low com-
plexity watermarking based methods to secure sensor data, independent of the
transmission interface.
3. Test the solution with real-world data: Our approach is to test the pro-
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posed framework on publicly available industry-standard datasets. In the case of
self-driving car applications, datasets such as the KITTI vision benchmark suite,
Mercedes Benz autonomous driving utility are used to evaluate the performance
of the proposed method. The evaluation criteria includes computational com-
plexity, robustness, accuracy in detecting the tamper and embedding induced
distortion estimation, etc. The distortion estimation is done on the vehicle
dynamics models and deep learning algorithms used extensively in developing
autonomous driving algorithms.
1.5.1 Document Road Map
• Chapter 2 ”Data Security Using Digital Watermarking”. In this chapter, we
provide a brief overview of watermarking techniques starting with their origin
and history. Discuss various applications of watermarking. Give a perspective
of watermark security aspects like securing the watermark vs securing the data
and outline different attacks on watermarks. Provide key differences between
watermarking and cryptography. Discuss various design requirements of water-
marking techniques and their mathematical representations. We conclude the
chapter by discussing the state-of-the-art watermarking techniques and provide
some examples of the techniques used in this research.
• Chapter 3 ”Watermarking & Data Models”. In this chapter, we define mod-
els that represent sensor data and demonstrate how the sensor data can be
viewed as n− dimensional vectors in Rn. Explain the watermarking concepts
using geometrical and communication model analogies. Transition into scalar
watermarking techniques like the Quantization Index Modulation (QIM) water-
marking method and explain the need for high dimensional lattice QIM codes.
• Chapter 4 ”RADAR Data Integrity Verification-2D QIM”. In this chapter, we
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discuss the implementation of a smart sensor data integrity verification method.
We propose a 2D QIM method to embed the watermark into the position infor-
mation of a RADAR sensor. We propose algorithms to detect and localize the
attacks on the integrity of the RADAR sensor data. The embedding-induced
distortion and its effects on sensor fusion algorithms are tested using an Ex-
tended Kalman Filter-based motion model and the results are discussed.
• Chapter 5 ”LiDAR Data Integrity Verification-3D QIM”. In this chapter, we
discuss the details of securing the raw sensor data using a LiDAR sensor. We
propose a 3D QIM technique to secure the raw point cloud obtained from the
LiDAR sensor and analyze the effects of embedding induced distortion on the
deep learning models performing object detection on the LiDAR data. We
also discuss the need to extend the plain QIM to a more random spread spec-
trum dither QIM method and identify the optimal configuration values for this
method.
• Chapter 6 ”Future Work & Conclusion ”. In this chapter, we propose future
directions to the research. We discuss how sensor fingerprints are used to build
countermeasures to regular channel attacks. We propose ideas to develop an
universal data transaction traceability and integrity verification mechanism for
various data transactions in autonomous vehicles.
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CHAPTER II
Data Security Using Digital Watermarking
2.1 Watermarking Background
The reference to the use of watermarks dates back to 480 B.C in Greek mythology.
In a popular tale of Herodotus, Histiaeus uses an ingenious watermark technique of
engraving a tattoo of the secret message on a slave’s shaved head and conceals it by
regrowing the hair. The slave reveals the secret message to Miletus after shaving the
head again. This explains the core of the watermarking where the secret message can
be communicated in plain sight. Along with the history of humankind, many tech-
niques of watermarking were portrayed especially for wartime communications. The
commercial applications of watermarking such as copyright protection can be seen
in 17th and 18th-century logarithmic tables. In these tables, errors were introduced
into the least significant bits to protect the intellectual property (Moulin and Koet-
ter, 2005). In the modern era, with the advent of the internet and communication
networks, many applications started falling prey to data leaks and copyright infringe-
ments thus increasing the need to develop techniques to counter such attacks. Digital
communications are increasingly getting susceptible to adversary attacks with the
development in computer technology and internet connectivity and so is the need to
ensure data confidentiality and integrity. People can now use the internet to exchange
data making it easy to both infringe the digital rights and also launch malicious at-
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tacks on confidential data. With the pervasive usage of the internet came the concept
of network information security. It deals with securing the data transmissions, stor-
age, and processing from data leakage, theft, tampering, and deleting (Lu and Guo,
2017). The increase in digital content in the form of digitized books, music, and
videos brings forward the challenge of copyright protection where the content pro-
ducer rights need to be protected as this digitized content is transmitted over the
network and shared by end-users. This openness in resource sharing needs efficient
methods to detect and prevent the tampering, plagiarism, and embezzlement of the
data. Several data protection mechanisms were developed over the last few decades
to solve this problem. These methods can be used independently or in combination
based on the problem they are solving. Encryption methods that are based on the
symmetric, asymmetric keys and hash functions are traditionally used to solve data
integrity issues. Message authentication can be performed using a digital signature
encryption scheme. These cryptography methods have some disadvantages such as
indicating attackers that the encrypted message is important, loss of security once
the attacker figures out the encryption method, giving the attacker a chance to make
the information fail authentication and make it useless with a slight change in the
data (Lu and Guo, 2017). In the late 90s, researchers started investigating alternate
methods to address some of the shortcomings of the cryptography methods and there
has been a revived interest in watermarking and data hiding-based methods. In the
following sections, we try to cover multiple concepts of watermarking starting with
the most common applications.
2.2 Applications of Watermarking
Digital watermarking is the art of embedding digital data into various forms of
digital media such as images, audio, video, and other digital object data. Tradition-
ally digital watermarking applications have been in the digital media domain but
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lately, these techniques are extended to other fields such as medicine and sensor net-
works. Based on the properties of the watermark various applications can make use of
them. Discussing the watermarking properties further would help us understand the
requirements of the watermarking better. Watermarking the digital data or object





These properties make watermarking techniques apt for many applications such
as
1. Content Identification & Protection
2. Digital forensics
3. Ownership and copyright protection
4. Content security and authentication
5. Broadcast monitoring





2.2.1 Content Identification and Protection
Content identification helps the digital media copyright owners, brands, and dis-
tributors to understand when and where their digital content is being consumed.
It can deter unauthorized use and help with an audit by reporting the distribution
paths of the content with accuracy. At the same time for the consumers, it gives an
ability to seamlessly stream content across multiple devices, makes the content easy
to search, and enables parental controls. Digital watermarking provides methods to
implement content identification management by providing a unique digital identity
to the media content that can persist even when the content gets transformed. Dig-
ital watermarks can be easily embedded into the content without interfering with
consumer enjoyment. The embedded watermark is imperceptible by humans but can
be easily identified by digital devices (Digital Watermarking Alliance, 2020).
2.2.2 Digital Forensics and Piracy Detection
In this application the watermarking gives an ability to the content owner to detect
and respond to the misuse of the assets, to gather evidence in criminal proceedings,
and also to enforce the contractual user agreements. Watermarking will supplement
digital rights management by combining the content owner copyrights with consumer
fair allowances. The way it works is, a forensic application embeds the identity of a
recipient into an asset copy at the time of production or transmission. The identity
could be situational metadata such as time, receiving format, and receiver details
such as an IP address. The forensic watermark retrieved from the leaked copy helps
identify the intended recipient.
2.2.3 Ownership and Copyright Protection
Copyright protection deals with proving the origin of the digital content. This is
the most common application of watermarking. The basic idea is of being able to
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identify the owner of the product by embedding some information. If the product’s
origin generates a controversy the embedded watermark can be extracted to determine
the owner if it.
2.2.4 Content Security and Authentication
The impact of counterfeiting digital content is widespread in terms of lost revenues
to the producer and fraud to the consumer. With digital watermarking, the content
can be authenticated through imperceptible watermarks embedded into the digital
content. The watermark can be encrypted and secured to further fortify the security
and only let the authorized devices to detect and access the data.
2.2.5 Location of Content Online
For the content producers, the need to protect their digital assets arises in today’s
growing content sharing platforms. In the corporate world as well the documents
and videos are transmitted through emails and across the internet. In these scenarios
the content producers should be aware of how the consumer is making use of their
content and if it is up to date. Digital watermarking can help through imperceptible
E- digital IDs. These IDs which are identified through unique search engines can be
used to generate reports and notify the owner of the location of the content.
2.2.6 Broadcast Monitoring
This application of watermarking, checks if a particular content is airing or not.
With the increase in the number of broadcast stations this ability to monitor content
broadcasting becomes important. Watermarking the content at the time of content
production or broadcast allows the broadcasters with great precision when and where
the content has been broadcasted and for how long. Digital watermarking works by
making subtle modifications to the original data and by adding some bits of data
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disseminated through the content.
2.2.7 Auditing
In a simple application of watermark usage in auditing, content owners and dis-
tributors may embed unique digital watermarks which serve as an identifier for each
licensed asset in their content. The identifier remains embedded in the asset and
is transmitted to every composition of the licensee that comprises all or part of the
original asset. This can enable an auditing application to evaluate the use of the
owner’s assets from every composition easily and automatically.
2.2.8 Access Control
Access control can be ensured by introducing client-side software that blocks rel-
evant media content based on the presence or non-presence of a watermark. TV
broadcasting, access to medical records, and network architecture, etc. are some
applications of access control.
2.2.9 Medical Applications
Medical records contain sensitive user information. Privacy, and integrity of which
are of utmost importance. Watermarking the medical records helps in maintaining
the access control, secured transmission, and prevents mismatch of the records.
2.2.10 Clandestine Communication or Steganography
Steganography is a form of conducting covert or stealth communications using
watermarks. Steganography can be considered as a subgroup of watermarking since
its goal is to embed a secret message into a medium. Steganography differs from
traditional watermarking in the fact that it does not care about the medium of
data exchange as long as the secrecy of the embedded message is maintained. In
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watermarking the signal that gets watermarked is referred to as original work or a
host signal and in Steganography, it is called cover work, these three notations are
used interchangeably in this document. The three most desired characteristics of a
steganographic system are undetectability, low watermark embedded distortion, and
high capacity. Steganography finds many applications such as wartime communica-
tions, clandestine communications by journalists or whistleblowers to avoid censorship
control, etc.
Data hiding techniques form a subset of watermarking methods that are exten-
sively used in steganography. In data hiding, a message is embedded in digital media
that can be retrieved later for establishing copyright or identification. Making the
data hiding technique robust to the compression algorithms or other distortions is a
prime priority in these applications. The embedded data need to be recovered and
reconstructed if needed by the application even when the host signal gets distorted.
The other main constraint of the data hiding technique is that the embedded data
need to be directly encoded into the media than into any header or wrapper, and this
embedding should not introduce a perceivable distortion to the host signal.
2.3 Watermark Security
Security requirements for the watermark can be viewed from two different perspec-
tives. One accounts for the watermark itself when the attacker tampers the watermark
and tries to defeat its purpose. The other accounts for the integrity verification of the
original data into which the watermark is embedded. These security requirements of
the watermark and the nature of the security are application dependent. In the ap-
plications that do not require securing the watermark the watermark is embedded to
add value to the content and customer convenience rather than to restrict the content
usage. In these cases, watermark security is insignificant since there is no motivation
to tamper with the watermark (Cox et al., 2008). On the other hand, applications like
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digital rights management might require the prevention of unauthorized embedding,
detection, and removal of watermark along with the protection from various system
attacks. These attacks that defeat the purpose of watermark embedding can be dealt
with by combining cryptography with the watermarking schemes. For example, in
the case of unauthorized detection, watermarking needs a large keyspace to secure
against this attack where-as by adding straightforward cryptography to the solution
this issue can be solved. The watermark message can be encrypted before embedding
and can be decrypted after the detection. Also, to prevent unauthorized embedding,
asymmetric key cryptography can be used to verify the source of the watermark em-
bedding. Cryptography can also be used to verify if the watermark recovered belongs
to the original work.
2.3.1 Threat Models
The watermarked signal can undergo several degradations in its lifecycle. Some of
these degradations can be natural such as the additive white Gaussian noise added to
the signal when it gets transmitted over a noisy channel or noise due to interference
of signal attenuation specifically in wireless transmissions. In the case of transmis-
sions over wired or wireless networks as the data passes through multiples nodes and
gateways there are chances of network-induced data attenuation like packet loss. In
some applications, the host signal has to go through certain required or legitimate
manipulations like data compression, transcoding, and signal processing, or any other
geometric manipulations. These changes to the data signal elements also affect the
watermark embedded into the data. The other type of degradations that could affect
the watermark are malicious attacks launched on the data either to compromise the
data integrity or to erase the watermark. When it comes to watermark security and
the host data security here are some of the common attack vectors that a typical
watermarking model has to deal with (Artru et al., 2019). Also, even adversaries can
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be active or passive. A passive adversary passively monitors the transmission channel
and illicitly reads the messages whereas the active adversary tries to either disrupt
the communication or modifies the data to transmit unauthorized data.
2.3.1.1 Removal Attack
In this attack the unauthorized user tries to remove the watermark or certain
targeted content from the host data signal (Begum and Uddin, 2020).
2.3.1.2 Interference Attack
In these types of attacks, the watermarked signal is embedded with noise through
signal processing functions like averaging, quantization, compression, etc. Here noise
can also be considered as an unwanted modification of data.
2.3.1.3 Geometric Attack
In these attacks, the host signal is subjected to geometrical transformations such
as translation, rotation of data points. In the case of images, this can also include
operations like cropping, image rotations, etc.
2.3.1.4 Filtering Attack
In these types of attacks, the signal data is passed through filters to remove low
or high-frequency components.
2.3.1.5 Active Attack
In the case of active attacks, the attacker tries to manipulate the watermark to
make it undetectable or completely removes it by directly manipulating the host signal
carrying the watermark at certain locations.
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2.3.1.6 Passive Attacks
In these attacks, the attacker stays dormant sensing and observing the data for
the presence of any watermarks
2.3.1.7 Data Degradation
In these types of attacks, parts of the host signal are removed that could not only
affect the integrity of the signal itself but also the embedded watermarks. When it
comes to protecting the original work, we need to answer several questions about
its authenticity such as, if it has been altered mildly or significantly, what parts of
the work have been altered, and can the work be restored. Although we might use
cryptography-based approaches to get answers to these questions about the tamper-
ing, watermarking methods are still useful as they do not require auxiliary data and
they undergo the same transformations as the host signal. To verify if the original
work has been changed at all or slightly modified, the exact authentication method
is used. This can be achieved by using fragile watermarking methods that are de-
signed to become undetectable with the slightest change in the original work. Another
approach could be embedding the cryptographic signatures as the watermarks. To
verify if the original work is modified by a limited set of illegitimate distortions while
allowing a predefined set of legitimate distortions is called selective authentication.
This can be achieved by using semi-fragile watermarking schemes. These methods
are built to survive a predefined set of distortions but they get destroyed by any
distortions beyond that set and hence deemed illegitimate. Tamper localization or
the ability to identify the time or the area where the original work got tampered with
is useful to verify the motive, source, legitimacy of tampering as-well-as to retrieve the
unaltered data for the application to use. Many techniques are available to localize
tampering, one of the main methods is the block-wise content authentication where
the cover work is divided into disjoint temporal or spatial regions, and each of which
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is authenticated separately. The accuracy of block-based localization depends on the
size of the block and the smaller the block size the more accurately we can localize the
tampering, this leads to another concept of sample wise authentication (Cox et al.,
2008).
Even when the host signal gets degraded, restoration of portions of work that have
been corrupted can be achieved through redundancy. One of the ways to introduce
redundancy is to use the error correction bits in a cover work as a watermark. Con-
sidering the host signal as a collection of bits, the error correction codes (ECC) such
as hamming, turbo, or Trellis codes are embedded as watermarks in this process. The
size of the ECC determines the maximum number of bits that can be corrected in
the host signal. Another technique to add redundancy is to self-embed a low-quality
copy of the cover work as a robust watermark which can be extracted even when the
original work gets tampered with.
2.3.2 Watermarking & Cryptography Analogy
Watermark embedding and cryptography can be considered analogous to each
other. The watermark embedding and detection are similar to the encryption and
decryption in cryptography. In the case of a simple symmetric cryptography we have
an encryption function Ek(.) that takes a clear text m and a key k to generate a
cipher text, mc, as
mc = Ek(m) (2.1)
The encryption protects the contents of the clear text during transmission. The
receiver of the cipher text need to decrypt to get to the original message. After the
decryption the text is clear again and is no longer protected. The decryption function
Dk() can be defined as
m = Dk(mc) (2.2)
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similarly, in watermarking we have an embedding function, ε(.), that embeds a mes-
sage m into original signal, Co and generates a watermarked signal, Cw. This can be
represented as
Cw = εk(Co,m) (2.3)
The message is extracted out of the watermarked signal using a detection function
D(). Many watermarking schemes use a key k to control the mapping between the
message and the watermarked signal. In the case of an informed watermarking where
the detector gets to know some aspects of the original signal, k can be assumed as a
function of the original work, hence it can be assumed that in the case of an informed
watermarking the detection can be as simple as associating a unique key with each
work. Thus the detector of any watermark can be generalized as
m = Dk(Cw) (2.4)
Though cryptography and watermarking share the same process steps, cryptography
focuses on data disguise. It is a study of different methods to transmit data as a
cipher or encrypted text so that the secrecy of the data is maintained until it reaches
the recipient. Encryption can protect data during the transmission but once the data
gets decrypted it loses protection. Watermarking, on the other hand, hides a message
in plain text data. The message is embedded in the data and carried by the data
that needs protection. In this process, a watermark or a tag/label is inserted into the
data and it is extracted at a later stage to establish the source of the data (Mohanty,
2003). Watermarking embeds a message in a host signal in a way that its presence
is not noticeable or in other words the secret message to be transmitted is hidden in
the original signal. The branch of watermarking that deals with information hiding
is called steganography.
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The difference between steganography and cryptography is that though both are
used to protect the information exchange, steganography does not give a clue that the
data has been embedded with the watermark hence leaves attackers clueless as they
do not see the need to decrypt the information. This makes steganography suitable for
tasks where the encryption cannot be used. One such use case is copyright protection,
where an additional hash appended to the message can be removed by the attacker
where-as if a message is embedded using the steganography makes it hard to detect
it and also remove it.
2.4 Watermark Design Requirements
Major applications of digital watermarking are the copyright protection of the
data source, protecting the authenticity of data, and the unauthorized manipulation
of the data. Based on the target application, requirements are set on the design of
the watermark. Figure 2.1 depicts some major requirements of the watermarking
Figure 2.1: Watermarking requirements
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techniques. The efficiency of the watermarking method applied in any application is
measured based on these requirements. It is desired that any watermarking system
provides a high data rate, low perceptibility or distortion, and yet high robustness.
These three goals are mutually exclusive hence usually the performance of a water-
mark embedding system is characterized by the achievable trade-offs between these
three goals (Brian and W, 2001). Here we discuss some of the general design require-
ments of the watermarking techniques
2.4.1 Imperceptibility
Imperceptibility or fidelity is an important feature of watermarking which is eval-
uated through the watermark induced distortion. Watermark-induced distortion
should be so small that it should be extremely difficult to perceive it. For instance, in
the case of the image watermarking, the watermarked image should appear the same
as the original image. Both of them should be perceptually indistinguishable. To
increase the imperceptibility of the watermarking process in images, some domain-
specific steps like large singular values selection for watermark insertion are used.
There are multiple ways in which the watermarked induced distortion is estimated.
In the case of a mesh or 3D watermarking the change in the geometry is used as a
method to evaluate imperceptibility. The most common methods to estimate geo-
metric distortion being Hausdorff distance and signal to noise ratio.
2.4.1.1 Hausdorff Distance
Considering a geometric model in 3-dimensional Euclidean space represented by





where v = (vx, vy, vz) are the vertices of a mesh in the 3D geometric
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2.4.1.2 Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR)
High signal to noise ration means better imperceptibility. The SNR between a
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model M is computed as
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2.4.1.3 Root Mean Square Error (RMSE)
Another measure to evaluate the imperceptibility is RMSE. Lower RMSE between
the watermarked and original models account for higher imperceptibility. The RMSE











While the RMSE measures the geometric distance between the corresponding ver-
tices in the watermarked and original models, it does not capture the subtle visual
properties that human eye appreciates such as smoothness. These features are cap-
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tured by more advanced Laplacian operators that take both topology and geometry
into account. The geometric Laplacian of a vertex is given by







where, n(i) is the set of indices of the neighbors of the vertex i, and lij is the geometric
distance between vertices i and j
2.4.2 Tamper Resistance
Detection of tampering in the watermark can be used to check the authenticity
of the original work. Any change to the watermark message can be considered as
tampering with the original work. Hence the integrity of the data can be determined
by checking the watermark. At the same time integrity of the data also determines
the integrity of the embedded watermark. Again, it depends on what needs to be
protected, the watermark, or the original data, and this decision is made based on the
application. Based on the resistance to the tamper, the watermarks are categorized
as fragile, semi-fragile, and robust. Bit Error Rate (BER ) is used as a generic tamper
resistance measure and it is used to measure the correctness of the method. A simple
implementation of BER between watermarked model M
′












A watermark is said to be robust in digital media if it can sustain any common
signal processing manipulation operations implemented in the original work. For ex-
ample, signal processing operations such as spatial filtering, lossy compression, image
enhancements, cropping, and geometric transformations can eliminate the watermark
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from the original image or a digital video and they could be used as attacks to beat
the purpose of the watermark. Often the robustness cannot be seen as a single-
dimensional value. A watermark that is robust against one process may be fragile
against another. Designing a watermark that is robust against all the attacks can
make it more complex to implement. Careful analysis of the application is neces-
sary to understand the role of the watermark and then the robustness can be crafted
based on the application needs. For example, in the case of broadcast monitoring
applications, the watermark only needs to survive the transmission process. For a
television broadcast, this means lossy compression, possibly analog to digital con-
version. It need not be robust against rotation, spatial transformations, high pass
filtering, or a variety of distortions that occur during the transmission and broadcast.
Similarly, in other applications like clandestine communications where the cover me-
dia is transmitted digitally without compression the watermark need not be robust
against spatial transformations. Also for applications such as sensor data integrity
verification where the watermark is used for data integrity verification or to check
whether the host data has been altered or not, the watermark need not be robust,
in-fact it should be fragile or semi-fragile. Applications such as ownership verifica-
tion, fingerprinting, copy control, etc need robustness since there is a high chance
that hackers target the watermark and try to remove it. To measure the robustness,
the most widely used approach is to extract the watermark from the distorted signal
and evaluate the difference between the originally embedded watermark with the ex-
tracted one. The common method is to calculate the correlation coefficient as shown
in the Equation (3.3).
2.4.4 Security
Security of a watermark becomes a key aspect in certain applications like copyright
protection, data authentication, digital content tractability, and fingerprinting. To
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ensure the security of the watermark several techniques such as logistic map based
encryption, key-based encryption are used.
2.4.5 Capacity
Watermarking capacity is defined as the amount of information that can be in-
serted into the original work while satisfying the robustness and imperceptibility
conditions for any given application. In other words, the capacity determines the
information holding limitations of the watermarking scheme while maintaining other
constraints such as imperceptibility and robustness. The watermark extraction de-
pends on the density of the watermark embedding or the watermark packing capacity.
For example, in the case of image watermarking, the extraction process is more suc-
cessful when the number of bits embedded in the host image is high. High channel
capacity increases the watermark detection probability and reduces the probability
of false alarms but at the same time increases the image distortion. Depending on
the application and its tolerance to the image distortion the embedding capacity
needs to be defined. Methods such as Gaussian channel approximations and game
theory-based approaches can be used to determine the capacity of a watermarking
algorithm.
2.4.6 Computational Cost
The computational cost for embedding a watermark into a cover work and extract-
ing it should minimal. The main criteria for estimating the computational cost is the
time it takes to embed and extract the watermark, the complexity of the embedding
and extracting algorithms, and their memory requirements. Usually, the more robust
the watermark is the higher is the computational cost. Based on the application
a good trade-off between the robustness and computational complexity needs to be
maintained. The computational cost can also be viewed as time complexity of the
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embedding or decoding algorithm. A common way to measure the time complexity is
to use the rate of increase in data rate due to watermarking. For example, in a video
frame if the original video stream has a bit rate Rx and the watermarked frame has
a bit rate R̂x, assuming a constant time process to embed bits per fame the increase
in bit rate can be computed as R̂x−Rx
Rx
× 100. This can be used as one of the measures
to estimate the computational cost.
2.4.7 False Positive & False Negative
The false-positive rate is the characteristic used to identify watermarks in a work
where there is no watermark embedded. This problem occurs when the embedded
watermark is different from the extracted watermark. This measure also checks the
efficacy of the watermark detector, especially when dealing with data integrity checks,
the false positives should be minimal. The false positive rate can be computed as a
ratio of the number of messages incorrectly identified as tampered to the total number





Similarly, the false-negative characteristic is used to identify if the watermark
detector can properly detect the embedded watermark in the cover work. Again this
measure brings some confidence in the watermarking system. In an ideal scenario
this criteria should be again minimal or close to zero. This can be computed as the
ratio of the number of cover work samples that are falsely identified as clean by the







Watermark keys constitute the generic term for secret information that determines
the parameters of an embedding function. For example, in the case of image water-
marking, the key could include host signal information like image coefficients or the
embedding domain like spatial domain, or the transformations like DCT. Often, to
ensure additional security in the embedding and extraction process of a watermark,
a secret key is used. The accurate estimation of the watermark key by the receiver
is important as it determines the degree of security of the watermarking system (Be-
gum and Uddin, 2020). Like in cryptography, this key generation can be symmetric
or asymmetric. In (Chopra et al., 2018) a method of using the XOR operation as
a key to insert the watermark at a predefined location in a biometric signature is
demonstrated. The side information used in informed watermarking can also be con-
sidered a type of key and in Chapter 4, a unique way to generate the side information
for RADAR data integrity checks is discussed.
2.4.9 Watermark Reversibility
A watermark is considered reversible if the host signal can be reconstructed after
the removal of the watermark. If a watermark is reversible, the extraction algorithm
should be able to completely remove the watermark and reconstruct the host signal.
This kind of watermarking could use side information or secret key in the process to
generate the host signal or the original work and to extract the watermark.
2.5 Watermarking Techniques
There are three main characteristics of a watermark, stealth, robustness, and se-
curity. The embedded watermark should not be visible to the attacker, the data
tampering should not affect the watermark and the legal owners of the data should
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only be able to retrieve the embedded watermark. Giving more emphasis on any one
of the attributes makes the other two weak, hence there is always a trade-off between
these three important characteristics in any watermarking method (Sin-Joo Lee and
Sung-Hwan Jung, 2001). Several watermarking techniques emphasize one characteris-
tic vs another based on the end application needs. Watermarking can be divided into
multiple categories in multiple ways. At a higher level, the classification can be done
based on the working domain, document type, algorithm type, human perception-
based, and application-based. Classification of the watermarking techniques based
on these criteria is shown in Figure 2.2. Here we discuss the classification relevant to
Figure 2.2: Watermarking techniques classification
our research. Based on the working domain, in particular to the digital media, the
watermarking can be divided into spatial and frequency domain or a hybrid approach.
2.5.0.1 Spatial Domain Watermarking
When it comes to the spatial domain the host signal or data is embedded with a
watermark in the spatial or time domain. The most common methods used in this
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category are the Least Significant Bit (LSB), Intermediate Significant Bit (ISB), and
QIM. These techniques are directly applied to the host data like the pixels in the
case of images. The spatial domain watermarking techniques maintain an optimal
balance between robustness, embedding induced distortion, and capacity. They are
also easy to implement, computationally less complex, and have faster execution
times. Because of their simplicity, any geometric manipulations to the host data
can result in watermark removal. Another advantage of these methods is that they




Figure 2.3: Amplitude plots of a raw and LSB modified audio sample
40
2.5.0.2 LSB
One of the simple data hiding techniques called the Least Significant Bit (LSB)
encoding is explained here to provide a perspective on the ability of the data hiding
techniques. In LSB or low-bit encoding, the least significant bit of each data sample
is replaced by a binary value representing the hidden message. Thus for a signal of
sampling rate 16 kHz, like an audio signal, the amount of data that can be hidden
using this method is 16 Kbps. The embedded watermark can be easily extracted
by reading the LSB of the received signal. The LSB in any data usually carries less
critical information, hence, this method provides high imperceptibility. In Figure 2.3,
(a) Raw camera image
(b) LSB modified camera image
Figure 2.4: Representation of raw and LSB modified camera image
a time series plot of a single channel audio file is displayed. The audio file is a single-
channel recording sampled at 16 kHz. It can be observed that there is no perceivable
difference between the raw samples and the LSB embedded samples. With this simple
LSB technique, another audio file is created in the region of acceptable fidelity in such
a way that the overall quality of the host signal is not compromised, but at
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the same time, a significant amount of hidden data i s transmitted over the channel. I n 
Figure 2.4, a 1242 × 375 × 3 i mage i s encoded by embedding i nverse of the least 
significant bit in each pixel. Again, it can be seen that there is no perceivable 
distortion, and yet a hidden message of size 1242 × 375 × 3 bits are stored in the 
embedded image.
Figure 2.5: Representation of raw and QIM modified LiDAR image
2.5.0.3 1D QIM
Similarly, Figure 2.5 shows two frames of a 64-bit LiDAR from the KITTI vi-
sion benchmark dataset (Chen et al., 2017). One of the frames is embedded with a
1D-QIM data hiding method. The implementation is similar to the LSB embedding
with a uniform scalar quantizer (Chen and Wornell, 2001). Further details on the
Quantization Index Modulation are presented in chapter 3, section 3.4. The pertur-
bation size chosen in this case is ∆ = 3 cm, which means, each data sample is moved
linearly by 3 cm after the quantization step. Again, we do not see any perceivable
distortion in the frame quality after the data embedding. From these examples, it can
be observed that irrespective of data dimensions, the data hiding techniques can be
used to embed a watermark into the data and yet not distort the data to the extent
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that it becomes useless. This embedded watermark can then be used to verify the
integrity of the data when transmitted over a channel or a network.
2.5.1 Frequency Domain Watermarking
Spatial domain watermarking algorithms are applied directly to the host signal
data and hence most of them are fragile. They can be easily manipulated which
leads to the need to apply the watermark in the transformed domain or space such as
frequency domain instead of the time or space domain. In these techniques, the host
signal is transformed into a pre-defined space and the watermark is embedded into the
transformed domain coefficients. At the receiving end, the inverse transform is applied
to retrieve the watermark. These transform domain watermarking techniques are
robust to different types of attacks like lossy compression and domain-specific signal
processing like image sharpening, cropping, filtering, noise addition, etc. Some of
the common domain transforming techniques are Discrete Cosine Transforms (DCT),
Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT), Discrete Fourier Transform(DFT), and Singular
Value Decomposition (SVD).
2.5.2 Perception Based Watermarking
Human perception-based watermarking can be divided into visible and invisible
watermark techniques. Visible watermarks are translucent whereas, invisible water-
marks are highly imperceptible. They come under the steganography or data hiding
techniques category and are more prevalent. The invisible watermarks can be further





Again, the choice of the watermarking stream depends on the end application goals
and computational resources. For example, robust and semi-fragile watermarking
techniques are generally used in copyright protection applications as those methods
try to make watermark robust to any data changes. On the other hand, fragile
watermarking gets distorted as the data gets tampered with and can be used to
detect the check the integrity of data. Fragile watermarking is typically the choice of
method in low power and low computational resource applications like Wireless Sensor
Networks to implement data integrity checks on the data transfers from one node to
another. Researchers proposed many fragile watermarking methods for resource-
constrained WSNs.
2.5.2.1 Fragile Watermarking
In this form of watermarking the level of a watermark, security is at the lowest
which means the embedded information can be easily removed. Any transformation
the original work goes through will destroy the watermark. Most of the basic spatial
domain watermarking techniques such as the Least-Significant-Bit fall under this
category. LSB watermarking can be easily detected, extracted, and removed if the
attacker knows the embedding technique. A similar technique to detect the location
of the tampered image has been proposed in (Qin et al., 2017). The end goal of this
watermarking is to make sure to detect the attacks on the integrity of the host signal
or the original data.
2.5.2.2 Semi-fragile Watermarking
Semi-fragile watermarking techniques ensure that the watermarking endures the
common application-specific modifications but they break if the host signal undergoes
significant changes such as geometric transformations or forgery, etc. This watermark-
ing technique is useful in applications such as media content transmissions where it is
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possible to know the kind of transformations that are applied to the host signal while
getting transmitted. The semi-fragile watermarking technique mentioned in (Kaur
et al., 2019) demonstrates that for the digital media signals that need to undergo
compression to save on bandwidth the semi-fragile watermarking protects against
channel noise and frame drop attacks while providing detection and localization of
more malicious attacks. Due to these characteristics, the semi-fragile spatial data
hiding scheme QIM is used to address the sensor data integrity verification problem
in our research.
2.5.2.3 Robust Watermarking
In the robust watermarking scheme, the watermark messages are securely embed-
ded into the host signal with redundancy to make it difficult to erase the watermark.
Copyright security is one of the primary applications of robust watermarks, as they
allow the watermark embedded by the owner to remain intact. There are multiple
ways to achieve robustness like redundancy or having multiple embeddings of the
same watermark, self-referenced watermarks, and embedding at a low-bitrate. In
(Parah et al., 2016), such a robust watermarking method for images that offers good
protection against common data manipulation attacks like scaling, cropping, image
rotation, and any combination of these attacks is discussed.
To conclude the introduction to watermarking, this brief overview of watermarking
tells us that it is a multidisciplinary field (Moulin and Koetter, 2005). It consists of
concepts and techniques from different areas such as signal processing, cryptography,
coding theory, information theory, and computer science. For the problem we attempt
to solve, which is sensor data integrity checks within the automotive domain, we chose
to go with the fragile watermarking techniques and QIM method in particular. In
the next chapter, we describe the generic watermarking models and explain how it
transcends into scalar watermarking and lattice codes.
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CHAPTER III
Watermarking & Data Models
3.1 Watermarking Model
In this chapter, we provide a generic overview of the watermarking process starting
with the sensor data modeling. The three basic components of any watermarking
scheme are watermark embedding, detection, and extraction. These three major
processes are implemented as functions that act on the corresponding input data.
Here we try to understand the geometrical meaning of these watermarking steps as-
well-as their analogy to the traditional communication models by getting into the
details of each step.
3.1.1 Data Model
To define the data model for multi-dimensional data, we use the notation of an
object and its features (Dzemyda et al., 2013). The object can be an instance or a
sample of the data and the features are the properties or the attributes that determine
the dimensions. Data samples that can be described by a set of features can be
considered as a data-set X = {x1, x2, · · · , xm} where, m is the length of the data-set.
If we use this notation, a particular sample xi of the data-set contains a combination
of values of all the features, represented as xi = {xi1, xi2, · · · , xin}, where n is the
number of features. The length of the feature set representing a sample can be
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considered as the number of dimensions and the data-set samples are represented as
points in n-dimensional feature space ∈ Rn.
The inputs to a watermark embedding function are the original unwatermarked
data Co, a message to be embedded m, and an optional key k. The embedder is a
deterministic function that maps these inputs to produce a watermarked work Cw
as an output. In watermarking terminology, the cover work/original work/the host
signal Co is the media content into which the watermark is embedded. Without the
loss of generality, Co can be considered as a set of points in n-dimensional media space.
If we use the notation of sample and feature set explained above, the cover work with
n different features can be represented as a set of m vectors, Co ∈ {c0, · · · , cm} in an
n-dimensional media space. Here, the media space can be considered as a subset of
Rn similar to the Euclidean space. The dimensionality of the signal depends on the
application and the selected sample space.
Let us take a look at the notations used to represent different digital media content
such as grayscale and color images, digital audio, video, and 3D point cloud geometry.
In the case of digital images, the dimensionality or the feature set depends on the
notation of the sample space. An image can be represented in a pixel or a frame
sample space. In a pixel sample space, for a grayscale image, the set of pixels can
assume a flat structure. This can be represented by a 1-dimensional tuple ofm number
of pixels per image. An example of such representation is a lexicographic scan image.
In a frame sample space the position of pixels in (x, y) plane can be considered as two
features, hence they are represented in a two-dimensional Euclidean space E2, hence n
becomes two. Similarly, a color image with three color planes (RGB) and m pixels per
plane can be represented in three-dimensional feature space as [x, y, channel], hence
n = 3. These sample space notations for grayscale and color images are depicted
in Figure 3.1. Also, in the digital media space, the content value is quantized and
bounded. This leads to a finite set of possible works in the media space that can be
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arranged in rectilinear lattices. If we consider the example of a grayscale image the
pixel values can be quantized within the integer range of values 0 to 255. Since the
data points are quantized with a specific step size form a lattice, the values between
the lattice points or that fall outside the bounds cannot be considered as part of
the original work. However, by adjusting the quantization step-size and making the
bounds large enough the media space can be considered continuous.
The above notation can also be extended to continuous or temporal content such
as audio & video. A digitized audio signal is a set of samples collected over time.
These samples can be divided into fixed-length segments that decide the length of the
signal m. The dimensionality of each segment is the time at which it is collected hence,
for an audio signal, n = 1. In the case of video, n would be the product of several
frames in a fixed segment, the number of pixels per frame, and three channels (RGB
planes in the color video). In the case of spatial point clouds such as the LiDAR point
cloud, each data point in the point cloud can be visualized by its position coordinates
[x, y, z], hence here n = 3. In each dimension the data points are represented as p, q, r-
dimensional vectors, and the quantized data is represented as linear, square, and cubic
lattices respectively. In Figure 3.1, the media space representation of LiDAR data in
an orthogonal coordinate system is shown. There are a lot of n-dimensional spaces
but in the context of this research, for the most part, we restrict it to spaces similar
to Euclidean space of n-dimensions with orthogonal global coordinates. Under this
assumption, a point in this n-dimensional plane can be considered as a vector from
the origin to the designated set of coordinate values. In Euclidean space, any n-
dimensional vector can be represented as a tuple of points in an n-dimensional space
Rn as x = (x1, x2, x3, · · · , xn), where xi ∈ R. With this notation, a line, plane, and
three-dimensional space can be represented by setting n = 1,2, or 3 respectively. A
point in the three-dimensional Euclidean space can be considered as a set of triples
(x, y, z) ∈ E3 (Hanson, 1994). When we are dealing with spatial data such as the
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point sampled geometry of a 3D model or LiDAR point cloud with spatial position
information, etc. the Euclidean space and media space can be used interchangeably.
Figure 3.1: Digital content representation
3.2 Geometric and Statistical Models
To view the watermarking process in a geometrical representation we consider a
high-dimensional space in which each point corresponds to one watermarked work.
Here the watermarked work is a type of watermark applied to the data in the media
space. This high dimensional space is called media space during the the embedding
phase. In the detection phase, it is referred to as marking space and represents
the watermarked works. The marking space can be considered as the projection or
transformation applied on the original work. These transformations such as frequency
transform, filtering, block averaging, geometric or temporal registration, etc. are
applied as a part of the watermark embedding and extraction processes.
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Geometrically, the watermarking system can be viewed as various regions of prob-
ability distributions in the media and marking space such as the distribution of un-
watermarked works, detection region, embedding region, and the region of acceptable
fidelity. In the watermarking process, though the embedded function itself is de-
terministic the randomness in the embedder’s output comes from the fact that the
original works are drawn randomly from the distribution of unwatermarked data. If
multiple unwatermarked data distributions are mapped into the watermarked work
Cw, the probability of Cw which is known as the embedding distribution is just the
sum of the probabilities of all the input distributions.
Distribution of un-watermarked works becomes useful in estimating the false pos-
itives in watermark detection. It estimates the likelihood of watermark embedding in
a media space. It is important to have a priori distribution of the content we want
the system to process since the watermarks are embedded in certain regions of the
media space. Like in an audio file the probability of embedding a watermark in the
music is higher than in the static. To represent this probability distribution over the
media space (lattice of points that represent digital work) or the probability density
function over all the points in the media space an elliptical Gaussian is considered
as a simple statistical model that fits this distribution. To understand the region of
acceptable fidelity consider an original work or the host signal in media space Co such
as an image. Just by altering a single pixel unit of brightness a new image can be
created which represents a new vector in the media space and yet perceptually in-
distinguishable from the original image. If we can imagine a region around Co which
constitutes the set of perceptually indistinguishable images from Co, this region in
the media space is called the region of acceptable fidelity. As explained in chapter
2, there are multiple ways to estimate the perceptual distance but the most common
method used to measure the perceptual distance metric is Mean Square Error (MSE)
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where C1 and C2 are N -dimensional vectors in the media space. If we set a limit
of τmse on this function, the region of acceptable fidelity becomes an N -dimensional
ball of radius
√
Nτmse . In some practical cases, the asymmetric distance between
an original work and its modified version is calculated based on the reciprocal of the









The distortion distribution tells us how likely the watermarked signal Cw is to be
distorted during normal usage or it gives the likelihood of obtaining a distorted work
Cwn, given the watermarked work Cw. For example, in normal digital media oper-
ations, the content distortion is caused by signal processing functions like filtering,
noise reduction, temporal or geometric distortion and lossy compressions. This distor-
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tion can be modeled as an additive Gaussian noise channel thus making it dependent
on the content itself.
The detection region for a given message, m and a watermark key k is the set of
works in the marked space that will be decoded by the detector as containing the
message. The linear correlation measure between two vectors is the average of the
inner product between vectors. This method is used in communications to check
the presence of a transmitted signal in the received signal. The linear correlation
coefficient is computed and checked against a threshold value to check the presence
of the transmit signal.
Similarly, in watermarking, linear correlation may be used as a measure to check
the presence of a watermark. This can be computed as the inner dot product or the
product of the received watermark signal Cw and the reference watermark Wr divided
by the length of the signal N
zlc(Cw,Wr) = Cw ·Wr/N (3.3)
If we want to use the correlation coefficient, we need to subtract the mean values
from the original vectors before performing the normalized correlation.
Geometrically, Equation (3.3) can be viewed as an orthogonal projection of Cw
into the constant length vector Wr. The values of Cw that are greater than a pre-
defined threshold τlc fall on one side of the plane perpendicular to Wr. This results in
a detection region comprising of the points belonging to one message and that leads
to the embedded message recovery. If we look at a simple case of binary message m ∈
{0, 1}, one side of the plane perpendicular to Wr as shown in Figure 3.2, corresponds
to points represented by m = 1 or τlc and the other represent m = 0 or − τlc.
A watermark embedding process is considered successful if the embedding results
in a work that falls in the intersection of the regions of acceptable fidelity and the
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detection as shown in Figure 3.2. Here a 2D media space is represented by the co and
reference watermark by wr vector. The circular area of acceptable fidelity intersects
the detection region to the right. The distance of the detection region from the origin
is determined by τlc. This concept can be extended to higher dimensions where the
detection region becomes a hyperplane orthogonal to the reference watermark plane
wr. If we pick high dimension vectors from Gaussian distribution, they tend to be
perpendicular to a given reference watermark plane. Thus, if we add Gaussian white
noise to the host signal vectors, the corrupted vectors tend to be parallel to the
detection region plane and hence easily distinguishable.
3.3 Communication Model
In this section, we look at watermarking as a communications problem. Thinking
of the watermarking method in terms of a digital communication channel enhances
our understanding. A generic watermarking system consists of two primary stages,
the embedder, and the decoder. The embedder combines a message m with the host
signal and generates a watermarked signal. As this watermarked signal gets to the
decoder additional distortion that could be both natural and malicious may get added
to the signal. The decoder extracts the embedded message from the resulting signal
using the auxiliary information. In a typical communication problem, there exists a
sender and receiver pair and a medium of communication between them known as a
transmission channel. If we look at the analogy between a watermarking process and
the communications systems, the sender in a communication system is analogous to
the embedder and the decoder is analogous to the receiver and the distortion can be
represented by the channel noise.
The sender has the signal to send to the receiver called as host signal in the media
space Co ∈ Rn. This signal is allowed to be modified within a certain limit and
the resulting signal is the watermarked signal Cw[m], where m ∈ M is the message
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Figure 3.3: Watermarking as communication model
to be embedded. In informed watermarking the embedded watermark depends on
a message mask based on the key k, the decoder has access to or the watermark is
derived out of the original work itself and the decoder is aware of the watermark
generation algorithm. The embedding process can be represented as
Cw[m] = f(Co,m, k) (3.4)
a function of the original work Co, message to be embeddedm and the side information
key k.
The category of a watermarking model that fits the sensor data integrity verifi-
cation problem we are trying to solve in this research is the side information based
blind decoding. In this model, the detector is not aware of the original signal, but
the auxiliary information such as the encoding message sequence or the key can be
used to make integrity verification more accurate (Cox et al., 2008). The applica-
tions presented in the subsequent chapters are based on this model. In Figure 3.3,
blind watermark detection is depicted as communication of message m and the host
signal Co over a communication channel. This embedding process induces distortion
that is constrained by the enforced distortion limits based on the end application.
This embedding induced distortion metric, de, between the original work and the
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watermarked work, represented as de(Co, Cw[m]), should be less than a threshold pe.
The watermarked message undergoes distortion and degradation in the transmission
channel tc that degrades the watermarked signal Cw[m] to Cwn[m] that is received
at the receiver end. The channel degradation considered here can include both the
required signal modifications such as a lossy compression as well as the malicious
attacks on the signal such as unwanted modifications. A completely distorted signal
will be of no value to the receiver, hence we can put some constraints on the channel
distortion. The channel tc is constrained such that the channel induced distortion
dc(Cw[m], Cwn[m]) < pc. The decoder receives cwn[m] along with the side information
k. With this information, the decoder estimates the embedded message mn, of the
original embedded message m.
In communication systems, the channel efficiency is assessed by measuring how
intact the received signal is. Similarly, in watermarking, the decoder’s ability to
estimate the embedded message accurately is used to measure the performance of the
watermarking scheme. One of the metrics to measure this performance is transmission
error rate. This metric is defined as the probability that the embedded message m
is different from the decoded message mn. Also, the rate R of the watermarking
algorithm is another metric used to measure the performance and it is defined as
R = log2 |M |
N
where |M | is the length of the message symbols and N is the number of
samples in the cover work Co. In other words, the rate defines the number of message
bits per symbol in the cover work.
If we model the original work Co as a random sequence of real i.i.d values s =
{s1, s2, s3, · · · , sn} over a media space S. Given a message m, uniformly drawn from
a message set M , the sender produces a watermark x = {x1, x2, · · · , xn}, such that
the embedding induced distortion d(s,x) < pe. The distortion between s and x can
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(si − xi)2 (3.5)
The transmission channel can be defined based on the choice of noise function applied.
In this study, we consider an additive noise channel where the signals are modified by
the addition of the noise. The noise can be drawn from a distribution independent
of the host signal distribution. In the simplest form, this noise can be modeled as a
Gaussian channel where the noise elements are drawn independently from a normal
distribution with zero mean and σ2n variance. The transmission channel tc, can be
modeled as a AWGN that modifies the watermarked work x, with noise samples in
n = {v1, v2, · · · , vn}. The resulting signal y can be represented as
y = x + n (3.6)
Decoder receives this signal and estimates the embedded message m. We assume
that the sender and receiver are aware of the channel power pc and not unaware of
the noise values vi. In this side information model, the sender and receiver share
the knowledge of the signal power Q, the embedding power pe and the message set
M along with any auxiliary information but the receiver is not aware of the original
work, S.
With these assumptions, if we consider the case of single cover work, the formula-
tion is equivalent to the classical problem of communication over an AWGN Gaussian
channel and the transmission rate R of such system can be given by Equation (3.7)









If we consider multi-message works, in a more general case, the encoder needs to
transmit a separate watermark signal sw within the embedding power constraint pe,
for every host signal s and each message m. Here, different sets of messages are
grouped by code words. The receiver needs to retrieve the message from the signal
degraded during transmission. For the receiver to be able to unambiguously decide the
received message, the code words for each message needs to be at a sufficient distance
from each other, and at the same time to achieve the embedding power constraint they
need to be densely packed. To fulfill this trade-off the codewords need to be optimally
selected and cannot be randomly picked from a set of uncorrelated Gaussian random
variables. To achieve this we need to part away from the one to one correspondence
between a message and a code word and get to a notion where one to many mappings
between a message and a code word exist such that there is a choice to pick the
codeword that better fits the host signal for any given message m. This notation is
called a dirty paper code.
In a dirty paper code technique, the code words that represent a message are
picked from the host signal to reduce the embedding distortion. The dirty paper code
scheme can be explained as, for each message m a code Cm is selected such that the
watermarked output x ∈ Cm is pretty close to the original signal s. At the receiver
end from the degraded signal y as shown in Equation (3.6), the receiver finds the
code word x
′
in the set C = ∪mCm which is an union of all the sub code books and
finds the index of the sub-code book to which x
′
belongs to.
If we think that each codeword is generated by a high-dimensional quantizer for
a given message m, all signals in s that are close to x ∈ Cm are represented by
x. This can be further explained using a simple example. Consider C = {C0, C1}
correspond to the union of the even and odd integer codebooks and a binary message
set M = {0, 1}. When the sender wants to send a message embedding 0 or 1, an even
or odd integer nearest in value to the unwatermarked signal s is transmitted and the
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receiver decodes the embedded message by picking the closest integer in C. If this
integer is even then the embedded message should be 0 and 1 otherwise.
Now that we looked at the watermarking process as a communication problem and
estimated the core features such as data hiding rate and the information embedding
capacity, we can take a closer look at the concept of generating the watermark. In the
case of blind watermarking, the generated watermark is assumed to be independent of
the original work or in other words, the correlation between the original work and the
watermark is very minimal. In the majority of practical watermarking applications
like the sensor data integrity verification, the unwatermarked data is known to the
embedder, this is called informed encoding. So the watermark wa, in this kind of em-
bedding is dependent on the original data Co or the data is provided as an additional
input to the encoder. Given this scenario, the watermark generators take advantage of
this knowledge and generate watermarks that have a low correlation with the original
data. Usually, to make sure that the linear correlation between the original data and
the message pattern is minimal, the watermark generator first computes the linear
correlation between the original data and the watermark and adjusts the amplitude of
the added pattern to compensate or reduce the correlation. In the data fidelity check
applications, where the watermark is considered as a noise, the document to noise
ratio is kept high. In the case of applications that require watermark effectiveness or
robustness, where the original data is considered as the noise, the watermark to noise
ratio is kept high. These adjustments are done while generating a watermark and the
optimum watermark is picked for a given application.
Also, the host-signal interference occurs from the systems that do not necessarily
let the embedder exploit the know-how of the host signal. In these cases, the host
signal itself acts as a noise and makes it difficult to decode the watermark and extract
the embedded message. One of the reasons for selecting the Quantization Index
Modulation (QIM) for our research is because it offers host signal interference rejection
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as it can exploit the knowledge of the host signal at the encoding phase. In QIM,
even in the absence of any perturbations, there will be quantizers that will let us
uniquely determine the embedded message m, this non-intersection property of the
quantizers is the reason behind the host-signal interference rejection property of the
QIM method (Brian and W, 2001). The watermark interference with cover work can
be examined using the perceptual models and the watermark magnitude wa can be
adjusted to reduce the interference.
Another way to look at the watermarking process is as a multiplexed commu-
nication. The embedder combines the watermark and data into a single signal Cw.
Original data is considered as a second message to be transmitted along with the
watermark message in the same signal. After the signal passes through the trans-
mission channel the watermark detector and the system that perceives or processes
the original data both receive the same data Cwn. Here, two different receivers de-
code two different messages Co and m. The system that does data processing on
the watermarked data should perceive or get data that is close to the original data.
Hence, the watermark induced distortion should be minimal for this system. On the
other hand, the watermark detection system should be able to obtain the watermark
without interference from the original data, hence, in this case the watermark fidelity
is an important criteria. The applications listed in upcoming chapters use this kind
of strategy to parallelize the watermark extraction and the signal decoding processes.
3.4 Scalar Watermarking
Watermarking methods that require each sample of the host signal to be sepa-
rately quantized or the methods that put restrictions on the codebook separation
are known as scalar watermarking methods. The capacity of an AWGN channel rep-
resented by 3.7 can be ideally achieved by watermarking schemes like ideal Costa
schemes (ICS). Without going into details, we can assume that the ICS achieves the
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maximum possible transmission rate because of the inclusion of codebooks that are
spread across high dimensional space and due to distortion compensation. The com-
parison between ICS and other practical scalar schemes such as the spread spectrum,
scalar costa scheme which can also be considered as distortion compensated QIM,
and the Dither modulation shows that the ICS outperforms all the scalar methods
as long as they are one dimensional but still these methods are effective ways to hide
information if data rate and capacity are not primary constraints of the application,
scalar watermarking methods are easy to implement or computationally less intensive
(Cox et al., 2008). The most popular scalar watermarking methods are LSB, QIM,
distortion compensated QIM, and scalar Costa scheme.
3.4.1 Binning Schemes - LSB
The basic scalar watermarking method is the LSB watermarking. As mentioned
in chapter 2, this method modifies the least significant bit in the host signal to
embed a watermark. If we take an example of an image as the host signal, where
each pixel is represented by a byte or 8-bit value the pixels are modified to carry
1 bit of information by changing the least significant bit (LSB) of the value. In a
more generic case, the LSB can be viewed as a type of binning scheme. Consider a
sequence S = {0, 1, · · · , 2b−1} partitioned into two bins such as even and odd integers.
Se = {0, 2, · · · , 2b− 2} and So = {1, 3, · · · , 2b− 1} , here Se and So can be considered
as two bins. Let S be a binary sequence of length N . Let X be the marked new
sequence generated by embedding the binary message m = {m1,m2, · · · ,mn} into S
and the embedding distortion constraint that X should satisfy is |X − si ≤ 1| for
1 < i < N . The LSB function can be implemented as
xi = mi + 2bsi/2c, 1 ≤ i ≤ N (3.8)
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we choose value of x based on the input message m
xi =
 xi ∈ Se : if mi = 0xi ∈ So : if mi = 1 (3.9)
We can interpret the LSB as a binning scheme in this regard where the Se or So are
the two bins from which the value of xi can be chosen based on the value of mi.
3.4.2 Quantization Index Modulation - QIM
The QIM and its variants of scalar watermarking methods were introduced by
Chen & Wornell in 1999. These methods embed signal-dependent watermarks using
the quantization technique and fall under the semi-fragile spatial watermarking tech-
niques category (Brian and W, 2001), (Chen and Wornell, 1998), (Chen and Wornell,
2001). QIM can be viewed as an extension of the binning scheme explained above.
Let’s say we have a set of L messages to be embedded into a host signal of length
L in L-dimensional space, QIM defines a unique set of L reconstruction points each
mapped to a quantizer in a set Q = {Q1, Q2, · · · , QL} (Joachim and Bernd, 2002).
The watermark embedding and decoding mechanism using the QIM method is fairly
simple. To embed a watermark message m, the host signal x is quantized using
the quantizer Qm to obtain a watermarked signal sw that is within a distortion con-
straint de. The watermark Qm is chosen by modulating the index of the quantizer
Q with the message to pick a quantizer from the set. While decoding, the receiver
quantizes the signal received sr by the union of all the quantizers used in embedding
Q = {Q1, Q2, · · · , QL} and the index of the reconstruction point with the quantized
value nearest to the received signal is identified and the corresponding watermark
information m̂ is extracted.
The basic idea can be explained by looking at a simple problem of embedding
one bit in a real-valued sample. Consider a binary message m ∈ {0, 1} is a one-bit
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Figure 3.4: 1D QIM scheme
message, and s ∈ R is one sample without any key k. A scalar uniform quantizer
with step size ∆ is defined as
Q∆(s) = bs/∆c∆ (3.10)
Figure 3.4 depicts the 1D QIM where two uniform quantizer sets represented by
circles and squares are shown on a real line. The quantizer set Q0 is defined by
uniform quantizer as shown in Equation (3.10), with a step-size ∆. The second set
of quantizers Q1 is represented by squares with an offset of ∆/2. Thus any point
falling in between the two quantizers is assigned a circle or a square based on the
embedded message value m ∈ {0, 1}. At the receiver end the value is error-free as
long as the distortion added is ≤ ∆/4. The scalar quantizatizer in Equation (3.10)
can be extended to a dither quantizer in Equation (3.11) by adding dither di values
Qi(s) = Qi(s− di) + di, i = 0, 1 (3.11)





, i = 0
∆
2
, i = 1
(3.12)
To increase the randomness in the quantized values, the dither values can also be
chosen from a pseudo-random uniform distribution over a given range. Given the
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above example, if d0 is chosen randomly over a distribution [−∆/2,∆/2] then the





; if, d0 < 0
d0 − ∆2 ; if, d0 > 0
(3.13)
where the dithers d0 and d1 embed bits 0 and 1 respectively. The watermarked signal
for a signal of length L is given by
yn = Q∆(xn, dm) = Q∆(xn − dm) + dm, where, m ∈ [0, 1], n = 1, 2, · · · , L (3.14)
If the quantization errors are uniformly distributed over [−∆/2,∆/2], and the quanti-




This watermarked signal when transmitted over a noisy channel or gets corrupted
by attacker results in a noisy signal as per Equation (3.6). In the QIM process, at
the receiving end, the decoder used is a minimum distance decoder. It finds the
quantizer point closest to the y and outputs the estimated message. In our binary




||y −Q∆(y, dm)|| (3.16)
In the case where the message is spread over N samples {x1, x2, · · · , xN}, which is
usually the case in dither modulation, to improve the robustness, the delta between






||yi −Q∆(yi, dm)|| (3.17)
Scalar watermarking schemes discussed above are one-dimensional. Optimal wa-
termarking rates for these schemes can be achieved if the size of the signal is suffi-
ciently large. To increase the watermarking capacity, for a given watermark to noise
ratio, we need to increase the message set M in an M -ary scalar watermarking scheme
to a larger value and resort to higher dimension vector quantizers. In high dimensions,
an M-ary scalar watermarking can be generalized by defining the super-set codebook
C consisting of all the multiples of step-size ∆ as
C = {k∆|k ∈ Z} (3.18)
which is the union of the sub-code books, Cm defined as
Cm = {(m+ kM)∆|k ∈ Z}; m = {0, · · · ,M} (3.19)
The closest value xm in the sub-codebook Cm is computed as
xm = QM∆,m/M(s) (3.20)
where the quantizer Q∆ is defined by Equation (3.10). The embedding induced dis-
tortion of Equation (3.15) becomes Pe = M
2∆2/12, for a uniform distribution of ∆
values over a small quantization interval. Again, the embedded message is decoded
from the received symbol by searching the point in the set C, with value closest to y,
and determining the sub-code book to which this point belongs to.
m = by/∆c mod (M) (3.21)
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In the case of the distortion compensated QIM, we bring a scaling factor α to
control the step-size and the host signal values are quantized using a step-size ∆/α.
By controlling the α we can control the embedding distortion hence it’s also called
the distortion compensation parameter.
sm = QM∆,m/M(αs) + (1− α)s (3.22)
To implement the higher dimension vector quantizers, we need to generate codebooks
in high dimensions, and doing this randomly is computationally intensive as it involves
searching for the best match code words in unstructured codebooks. For most of
the practical applications where the signal lengths are constrained and where the
generalized multidimensional codebooks are not available, we still want our codebooks
to be separable or need each sample of the host signal to be separately quantized with
an optimal transmission rate. A rather simple approach to achieve this would be to
go with structured codebooks in higher dimensions such as, lattice codes, which are
proved to provide better performance than 1D scalar codes.
3.5 Lattice Codes
A lattice is defined as an infinite set of points arranged in a repeated structure
filling the space and the geometry that can be generated by repeated translations of
the single starting point (Hanson, 1994). A space lattice is defined by a set of repeated
points in m-dimensional real Euclidean space R m that fill the space. The set can be
generated from k linearly independent vectors {a1, · · · , ak} called generating vectors
of the lattice. The lattice points are formed by the linear combinations of these
generating vectors
R = n1a1 + n2a2 · · ·nkak (3.23)
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where ni ∈ {Z} and k represents the lattice Λ dimensions. The core basis unit of
a lattice that gets repeated is called a unit cell. In two dimensional lattice the unit
cell is an area and in three dimensions its a volume. Example of a two dimensional
lattice, is a Bravais lattice represented as R = (n1d, n2d). It is a simple cubic lattice
with lattice spacing d. The generator vectors for simple cubic lattice are a1 = (d1, 0)
and a2 = (0, d2). There are also different other forms of 2D Bravais lattices like
rectangular lattice and hexagonal lattice with generator vectors a1 = (d, 0) and a2 =
(d/2,
√
3d/2) as shown in Figure 3.5 (Cleland, 2003). In three dimensions, again,
Figure 3.5: Simple 1D and 2D lattices
a simple representation of a 3D lattice is a simple cubic. The simple cubic lattice
consists of points spaced along the three coordinate axes R = (ld,md, nd) for l,m, n ∈
{Z} and d being the lattice spacing. This geometry can be further extended to face-
centered and body-centered lattices as shown in Figure 3.5.
The root lattices are the n-dimensional latices denoted by An(n ≥ 1), Dn(n ≥ 2),
and En(n = 6, 7, 8), they give dense sphere packing if n ≤ 8. They can be used as
a basis for the efficient block quantizers for uniformly distributed inputs. Since a
lattice is a repetition of a structure, every lattice point is surrounded by its Voronoi
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region. This region is defined as a space consisting of the nearest neighbors to any
given point. Voronoi regions are also called nearest neighbor regions, Wigner-Seitz
cells, or Dirichlet regions. If a lattice x is used as a quantizer all the points in the
Voronoi region around the lattice point are represented by x (Conway and Sloane,
1982).
3.5.1 Lattice QIM
Figure 3.6: Quincunx lattice
We can extend the scalar QIM to L dimensional vector quantizers to form lattice
quantizers. Here, for a given lattice Λc the quantization function Q can be viewed
as a mapping between each point x ∈ RN to the nearest lattice point in Λc. The
Voronoi cell v of the lattice Λc, can be defined as {x in R; Q(x) = 0}. A more
formal definition of a lattice would be an integral combination of the basis vectors
Λ = {x = vG, v ∈ ZN}, where, G is the generator matrix or the N × N stack of
the lattice basis vectors. The coarse lattice Λc can be considered as a sub-lattice or
the shifts of partition of Λ. A fine lattice Λf is defined as the N-dimensional lattice
partition Λf/Λc, of a nested lattice, where Λf ,Λc ⊂ Λ. If we define a coarse lattice
Λc = ∆Z
N and a fine lattice as Λf = ∆Z
N ∪(∆/2, · · · ,∆/2)+∆ZN then the Voronoi
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cell v becomes an N-dimensional cube [−∆/2,∆/2]N whose normalized second order
moment is equal to ∆2/12. Lattice quantizers are superior to scalar quantizers though
scalar quantizers are more prevalent due to their simplicity. To explain the way lattice
quantization works we can take a look at the two-dimensional Quincunx quantization.
If we consider a host signal component X ∈ R2 such as the target position information
generated by an automotive RADAR sensor. The target location is represented by
a pair of position co-ordinates in the two-dimensional Euclidean plane x1, x2 ∈ X.
In general, we can model this data under the assumption that the variables (x1, x2)
are drawn from an i.i.d Gaussian distribution. In Quincunx quantization, one bit
is embedded by modifying the position of a pair of samples (x1, x2) as shown in
Figure 3.6. In this method, for embedding either ’0’ or ’1’ two separate coarse lattices
Λc,0 and Λc,1 are used and they are then obtained by using two different quantizers
Q0 & Q1. We consider a square Voronoi cell to represent each element of the lattice.
The size of Voronoi cell is regulated by the quantization step-size ∆ (Zolotavkin and
Juhola, 2015).
If we extend this concept to a hexagonal lattice as shown in Figure 3.7, the quan-
tizers associated with the lattice structure can be used to embed two bits into the
samples taken from R2. The quantizers Q1, Q2, Q3 are obtained by perturbing the
quantizer Q0. This can also be viewed as the center of the solid hexagonal lattice
(0, 0) shifted over to the coset headers represented by (01, 10, 11) respectively, which
can be considered as a set of reconstruction points. It can be observed that in hexag-
onal lattice QIM or any QIM structure in general, the robustness depends on the
distance between the coarse lattice or the center of the solid hexagon in Figure 3.7
and the coset points. Robustness requires the distance to be higher but this will
also increase the perceptibility of the watermark. The sphere packing capacity of
the lattices provides some ways to find a trade-off between these two parameters. It
is proved that the QIM system has high robustness at the cost of a low perceptual
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impact together with flexible payload possibilities (Bohó et al., 2013). Now let us
Figure 3.7: Hexagonal lattice QIM scheme
take a look at the QIM properties of lattice quantization. To understand this we
take a look at the vector QIM as explained by Chen & Wornell. This scalar QIM
concept from Equation (3.11) can be viewed from a lattice point of view where the
reproduction levels of quantizers Q0 and Q1 show in Figure 3.4 form two cosets of








If we replace the scalar quantizer in Equation (3.11) with an L-dimensional Vector
Quantizer (VQ) we get L-dimensional lattice quantizer equation. Let’s take a look
at the simple case of L=2, the VQ is obtained by independently quantizing each co-
ordinate shown in Figure 3.6. The lattice into which each co-ordinate gets quantized
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) + ∆ZL (3.25)
The embedding induced distortion for this VQ is given by D1 = ∆
2/12 and the rate
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of coding is computed as R = 1/L. The rate R ranges from 1/L to 1 based on the
number of bits embedded per dimension. The minimum distance between the cosets














|αy − p| ) (3.27)
If the regular quantization function Q : RN → Λc is replaced with a dithered quanti-
zation function for any given x ∈ RN and dither d ∈ ν the dither quantization output
can be represented as
x̂ = Q(x− d) + d Λc + d (3.28)
if the external dither is independent of x, and uniformly distributed over ν then the
quantization error x̂−x is also uniformly distributed over ν. If the dither d is shared
with the decoder it can be used to randomize the lattice QIM code and provide some
level of protection against attacks on the code. Thus, for a given message m and host
signal s the dithered lattice QIM equations can be written as
u(m) = Q(αs− dm − d) + dm + d ∈ Λm (3.29)
and the marked sequence can be shown as
x = (1− α)s+ u(m) = (1− α)s+Q(αs) (3.30)
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The lattice quantizer results in an M-ary code book, C = {(0, · · · , 0), (∆/2, · · · ,∆/2)}.
If length of M grows exponentially with the length of the signal N , the lattice parti-
tion Λf/Λc must satisfy the following properties for better watermarking performance
1. Q must have a bounded mean square distortion D1 and ν should be a nearly
spherical
2. C should be largely spaced
To satisfy the properties listed above, we need Λf and Λc, to be high dimensional.
For all the practical purposes arbitrary high dimensional lattices cannot be built with
low computational complexity. To simplify the code generation in higher dimensions,
often, the lattices with special structures such as a product of a low-dimensional lattice
(cube or cuboid), trellis-coded scalar quantization, or the classical error correction
codes like Hamming code are used to define the fine lattice Λf .
In the following chapters, we explore the practical applications of the basic 2D
and 3D lattice quantizers and how they can be applied to solve the sensor integrity
verification problem in the automotive domain.
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CHAPTER IV
RADAR Data Integrity Verification-2D QIM
A modern-day vehicle evolved into a cyber-physical system with internal net-
works (Controller Area Network (CAN), Ethernet, etc.) connecting hundreds of
micro-controllers. Starting from the traditional core vehicle functions such as vehicle
controls, infotainment, power-train management to the latest developments such as
Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) and automated driving features, each
one of them uses CAN as their communication network backbone. Automated driv-
ing and ADAS features rely on data transferred over the CAN network from multiple
sensors mounted on the vehicle. Verifying the integrity of the sensor data is essential
for the safety and security of occupants and the proper functionality of these applica-
tions. Though the CAN interface ensures reliable data transfer, it lacks basic security
features, including message authentication, which makes it vulnerable to a wide array
of attacks, including spoofing, replay, DoS, etc. Using traditional cryptography-based
methods to verify the integrity of data transmitted over CAN interfaces is expected
to increase the computational complexity, latency, and overall cost of the system. In
this chapter, we propose a light-weight alternative to verify the sensor data integrity
for vehicle applications that use the CAN network for data transfers. To this end, a
framework for 2-Dimensional Quantization Index Modulation (2D QIM)-based data
hiding is proposed to achieve this goal. Using a typical RADAR sensor data transmis-
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sion scenario in an autonomous vehicle application, we analyze the performance of the
proposed framework to detect and localize the sensor data tampering. The effects of
embedding induced distortion on the applications using the RADAR data are studied
through a sensor fusion algorithm. It is observed that the proposed framework of-
fers the much-needed data integrity verification without compromising on the quality
of sensor fusion data and is implemented with low overall design complexity. This
proposed framework can also be used on any physical network interface other than
CAN, and it offers traceability to in-vehicle data beyond the scope of the in-vehicle
applications.
4.1 Introduction
Since most of the smart sensors as explained in chapter 1, section 1.2.2 use CAN
or CAN-FD interfaces for data communication, a vulnerability assessment to cyber-
attacks is prudent for these network types. The CAN interface is widely used in
the automotive industry due to its robust and fault-tolerant design, however, CAN
lacks inherent security to protect against different network attacks. The shortcom-
ings in CAN protocol such as the broadcast message format, clear data transfers,
and lack of mechanisms to establish data authentication and confidentiality, expose
the CAN network to masquerade attacks, replay attacks, and additional exploits
(Lin and Sangiovanni-Vincentelli, 2012). The amount of viable attack vectors on
the CAN network has been demonstrated on numerous occasions within automotive
security research (Miller and Valasek, 2015). To mitigate known vulnerabilities in
CAN, several methods like payload encryption, frame ID-based filtering (Woo et al.,
2015), and message authentication code (MAC) calculated based on the payload data
are developed. A transport layer security architecture can be built over CAN that
can combine both cryptography and MAC to ensure data integrity and authenticity.
As more vehicle manufacturers adopt Automotive Open System Architecture (AU-
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TOSAR) based platforms for vehicle development, the secure onboard communication
(SecOC) is gaining traction, which is again another MAC-based authentication pro-
tocol for individual protocol data units (PDU) (AUTOSAR CP Release 4.3.1). When
it comes to adopting this traditional cryptography and MAC-based security mecha-
nisms in autonomous vehicles, many practical issues like key management, freshness
value handling, and the recovery strategy or how to deal with the failed authentica-
tions need to be taken into consideration. Also, the bandwidth and payload length
restrictions of the CAN network make it impossible to implement these methods.
The legacy systems need to upgrade to CAN-FD that shares the same architecture
as CAN but provides more bandwidth due to flexible data rates (Woo et al., 2016).
Resolving such practical issues increase the development and maintenance cost of the
product as-well-as the overall complexity. To deal with such implementation level
Figure 4.1: Radar data stream
and practical shortcomings of the traditional data integrity verification methods, we
introduce a new data hiding based watermarking approach. This approach solves the
problem of the data integrity verification in resource-constrained and real-time appli-
cations with simple algorithms that do not tax the system with high computational
complexity at the same time do not increase the bandwidth requirements of the in-
terface as no additional data is added to the payload. In this method, the watermark
is embedded into the sensor using a light-weight software algorithm, which is easy
to implement. The concept of using data hiding techniques for sensor data verifi-
cation was introduced in (Changalvala and Malik, 2019b) for raw sensor data used
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in a centralized autonomous driving architecture (Jo et al., 2014). In this chapter,
we analyze a different modality; we consider a smart RADAR sensor that produces
the processed data. The proposed watermarking method is implemented on the pro-
cessed RADAR data and its effects on the outcome of a sensor fusion algorithm are
verified. With the constraints in the automotive networks as mentioned in the sec-
tion 1.3 in mind, here we propose a watermarking solution that can work well under
these constraints and yet help verify the integrity of the sensor data. The traditional
watermarking methods are vulnerable to watermark estimation attacks. To address
it, we propose to introduce freshness in the watermark generation process based on
the data available on the in-vehicle network such as the GPS timestamp to generate
a watermark to be embedded into the sensor data that need to be secured. Sharing
the watermark generation algorithm between the sensor and the receiver eliminates
the need to exchange the watermarking scheme over any secure channel. Another
Figure 4.2: Block-diagram of problem statement
aspect to consider while using the data hiding based watermarking techniques is the
embedding induced distortion. Through experiments, we provide an analysis on the
embedding induced distortion of the 2D QIM method and its impacts on sensor data
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and downstream fusion algorithms.
4.2 System & Attack Model
In the system model, we assume that a centralized ADAS unit makes autonomous
driving decisions using the data fed by satellite sensors over the vehicle network, as
shown in Figure 4.2. The ADAS unit fuses incoming data and performs the necessary
information extraction from the object detection lists. This processed information
is further used to build autonomous vehicle features like perception and localization
(Changalvala and Malik, 2019b). We assume that both the sensors or data origin,
and the sink or the central data processing ADAS module are clean. The data input
into the system via sensors is authentic. The attacks are launched during the data
transmission from the sensor to the ADAS module over the vehicle network, as shown
in Figure 4.2. This threat model is more attractive to attackers as the impact factor
is high. The damage that can be done by continuously faking or deleting the sensor
information as an insider attack is high for autonomous vehicle applications. The
system requires a GPS receiver on the vehicle network transmitting timestamp data
periodically, and the sensors, along with the ADAS unit have access to this GPS
data. The data structure is shown in Figure 4.1 is assumed for the RADAR sensor
data. Each data-set starts with a header delimiter that contains information such as
the number of tracked objects, unique data identifiers, etc. The header is followed
by the stream of data elements themselves that can contain multiple fields based on
the capability of each RADAR sensor unit, but for simplicity, we assume the mini-
mum content such as the tracked object Cartesian coordinates (x, y). This position
information is used to embed the watermark. The proposed QIM based watermark
embedding method works directly on the data; hence it is important to verify that for
a given application, the embedding induced distortion does not affect the output of
the application consuming the data. In this chapter, we use a sensor fusion algorithm
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called Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) that is widely used in autonomous vehicle ap-
plications to analyze the embedding induced distortion. The sensor fusion algorithm
takes in the RADAR and LiDAR sensor data and outputs the predicted position of
the tracked object.
Figure 4.3: State vector for pedestrian motion
4.2.1 Sensor Fusion Data Model
The data-set used to test the proposed framework is generated using the reference 
code provided by Mercedes Benz autonomous driving utility (Mercedes Benz T., 2018). 
The data generation scenario is to predict the path taken by a pedestrian walking in 
front of the vehicle using the on-board sensors, LiDAR, and RADAR, as shown in 
Figure 4.3. The data-set contains sensor measurements of the location and velocity of 
the pedestrian. The RADAR sensor measurements are represented in polar coor-
dinates as ρ, φ, ρ̇, where ρ is the radial measured distance to the target, φ is the 
measured lateral angle to the target, and ρ̇ is the rate of change of ρ that results in 
radial velocity. The Radar measurements are converted from polar to Cartesian
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coordinates using the following equations.
x = ρ ∗ cos(φ)
y = ρ ∗ sin(φ)
(4.1)
The LiDAR measurements are represented as position coordinates (x, y). Along with
these measurements, the data-set also contains the GPS timestamp at which the data
is collected. The time delta between sensor measurements is set to δt = 50 ms. At
each time sample δt, the ground truth values for the pedestrian position and velocity
for each sensor (px, py, vx, vy) are calculated based on a constant velocity motion
model. The motion model considered for data generation is a 2D bicycle model, and




= x+ v · δt · cos(θ)
y
′
= y + v · δt · cos(θ)
(4.2)





are the initial and final position values respectively. From these ground truth values,
Figure 4.4: Proposed framework and 2D QIM embedding process
the measurement values at each time step are obtained by adding uncertainty in the
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form of Gaussian noise of configurable variance. The measured values are represented
as the following
mtk = gtk + ε (4.3)
where mtk , gtk , represent the measurement and ground truth values respectively at
time tk and ε is the measurement error represented by an independent and identical
distribution (i.i.d) Gaussian noise with zero mean and covariance matrix R > 0, i.e.
ε = N(0, R).
4.3 Proposed Framework
Figure 4.5: Block-diagram of proposed method
In our proposed sensor data integrity verification framework, we assume the follow-
ing. First, the sensor and the ADAS processing unit share the watermark generation
algorithm. Second, the ADAS processing unit collects detection lists from different
sensors, in this case, LiDAR and RADAR, and generates a fused list of detection.





The watermark generation is done in the sensor using the GPS timestamp infor-
mation. This binary sequence of message me = f(tgps) is embedded into the position
data of the object detection list from the sensor using 2D QIM data hiding method.
This watermarked data is transmitted to the ADAS unit over an in-vehicle communi-
cation network, such as CAN. The ADAS unit receives the watermarked data along
with the timestamp from the GPS sensor. This data is given as an input to the sen-
sor fusion algorithm as-well-as to the integrity verification algorithm. The integrity
verification algorithm that runs in parallel to sensor fusion generates the embedded
message sequence me using the same method as the sensor. Also, the embedded mes-
sage sequence from the received frames md is extracted using the decoding process.
The decoded message sequence is compared against the embedded message sequence
to detect and localize the modified data across different attack vectors, as explained
in section 4.4. data tampering is detected, a validity flag is set to qualify the fused
Figure 4.6: Time-stamp conversion
object list. This is represented as a fire-wall between the ADAS unit and the motion
control unit in Figure 4.5, which prevents the tampered data from controlling the
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vehicle. The data integrity verification mechanism is portrayed as a silent spy in Fig-
ure 4.5. It acts in the background unnoticed by the attacker to detect and localize the
tampering and alerts the vehicle control algorithm about the integrity of the data.
4.3.1 Watermark Generation
A core component of our integrity verification network is our watermark gener-
ation technique. Our proposed model leverages timestamp from GPS sensor data
to generate a binary sequence that will be embedded into subsequent RADAR data
frames downstream. The diagram in Figure 4.6 represents a visual depiction of a
GPS sensor timestamp converted into a bitstream. Assuming an architecture sup-
porting little endianness, the two least significant bits (LSB) and the most significant
bit (MSB) nibble are parsed and stored in a secured buffer, to be utilized by the se-
quence generator described in Algorithm 4. The LSB pair stored is used to determine
the starting bit pair for the generated sequence. This adds a level of obfuscation to
the generated sequence by changing the starting bit pair of the binary sequence to be
embedded in the available data elements. In addition, the MSB nibble is converted to
its decimal representation and utilized as a seed value to generate a random number
to fall within the theoretical maximum for potential data elements generated in one
message payload.
The sequence generator represented by Algorithm 4 will utilize the previously
gathered information from the GPS time stamp to generate a deterministic sequence.
This process involves taking the range limited random number x, generated from the
seed value of the MSB nibble, where: numPairs = bxc to determine the length of
the sequence. A two-bit value is then incremented and appended to the generated
sequence buffer. The proposed 2D QIM embedding method allows for a message
sequence of integer values in range (0 ≤ mval < 4), hence the generated two-bit
value is modulated by 4, to keep it within the allowed range. The desired length
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of the sequence is, by design, dependent on the seed value calculated from parsing
the GPS timestamp. If the sequence is shorter than the amount of data elements in
the message payload, the generated sequence will be reused. The randomness in this
generated message sequence comes in the form of the start pattern and the length of
the message sequence both of which can be recreated by the receiver using the same
GPS timestamp message.
4.3.2 Watermark Embedding
Figure 4.7: 2D QIM scheme
We use a 2D QIM-based data hiding method for watermark embedding. Here we
use simple cubic lattice QIM approach mentioned in section 3.5. If we use regular
quantization function in Equation (3.28), the resulting watermarked signal sw for a
2D QIM can be represented as:
sw(sck ,mk) = qmk(sck ,∆) (4.4)









It can be observed from Equation (4.5) that the host signal gets modified after the
data embedding and the distortion level is proportional to the perturbation. This
feature provides the flexibility to select a distortion level that works for a particular
end application. This motivated us to select QIM over other available watermarking
methods. In QIM, the quantization operation uses a unique set of quantizers that
result in a reconstruction grid (Joachim and Bernd, 2002). The dimensionality of
the reconstruction grid depends on the message symbol size. If a message has an
n-dimensional symbol, it results in a log2(n)-dimensional reconstruction grid. For
example, a binary message m ∈ {0, 1}, where n = 2 results in a 1D reconstruction
grid. If we extend this concept to a two-dimensional data-set like RADAR data-
position vector (x, y), a four-dimensional message symbol m ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} can be
used to hide data resulting in a 2D reconstruction grid. Each corner of this grid
can be considered as a reconstruction point in recovering the embedded message. In
Figure 4.7 a sample data set is depicted with different embedded message symbols.
After the initial quantization, the position data points that fall within the highlighted
polygons are represented by the center of the regular polygon or the black dot ck =
{xk, yk}. In 2D QIM, based on the embedded message symbol mk = {mxk,myk},
this center point is moved to one of the eight fixed locations on the boundary of the
polygon as represented by the red dot. The minimum value of the separation distance
between the reconstruction points dmin, determines the resilience of the framework
to the channel noise. This is a configurable parameter in QIM based watermarking
that comes as an advantage when trying to adapt this framework to different end
applications. Another advantage being the host-signal interference rejection because
of the non-intersecting reconstruction points (Chen and Wornell, 1998).
In the proposed framework, a simple algorithm parses through the generated mes-
sage symbols and applies the corresponding quantizer to the RADAR position data
as per Equation (4.5). The sender uses the GPS timestamp from a pre-defined in-
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terval and is based on the procedure explained in section 4.3.1; the watermark is
generated and embedded into the data elements of the RADAR data as shown in
Figure 4.4. The modified data is transmitted over the selected data transfer interface
like CAN/CAN-FD with additional meta-data included in the header that acts as
a delimiter to the data-elements. The watermark stays with the data irrespective
of the data-link or transport protocols used to send the data to the receiver. Also,
since there is no additional data added in the form of MAC, the interface bandwidth
requirements remain the same.
4.3.3 Watermark Decoding
The RADAR detection object list data received by the ADAS unit can be directly
used by the sensor fusion algorithm. Tamper detection and localization algorithms
can run in parallel. This is a significant advantage of the watermarking method over
any other encryption-based methods. The decoding algorithm works similarly to the
embedding. Each received position value is quantized using all the different quantizers
used for embedding to generate different reconstruction points, which is a set of four
in our case. These four reconstruction point values are compared with the received
value, and the reconstruction point that returns the least difference value, as shown






w(si,md) represents a distorted received signal, mi is the embedded message
and md is the decoded message. The decoding step also regenerates the embedded se-
quence following the same procedure explained in section 4.3.1 as it receives the same
GPS timestamp over CAN. Here it is assumed that the sensors are time-synchronized
by the universal timestamp provider such as a GPS sensor (AUTOSAR CP R19-11).
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4.4 Security Analysis & Performance Evaluation
Successful attacks are the ones that go undetected by the detection framework.
In this section, we discuss various attack scenarios possible if an attacker gets access
Figure 4.8: Data addition attack vector depiction
to the vehicle network and how the proposed framework can detect and localize these
attacks. As a part of the attack model, we assume that the attacker has a good knowl-
edge of the vehicle network protocols and automotive electrical system architecture.
He has tools available to sniff the vehicle network and replay the modified messages
on CAN/CAN-FD. With this knowledge, we identified three ways the attacker can









Data addition is an attack scenario where the attacker modifies the RADAR reflec-
tions or tracklets with additional fake data elements either by copying the existing
elements or by adding completely random data. A typical add attack scenario is
represented in Figure 4.8, the data elements D6 and D11 are added to the origi-
nal sequence of the RADAR data, increasing the total count of elements from n to
n+ 2. With the proposed framework, position information (x, y) is 2D QIM encoded
by the sender with a message pattern generated based on the GPS timestamp, as
explained in section 4.3.1. This message pattern is represented by color-code (Red,
Green, Blue, and White) in Figure 4.8. Here, for simplicity, we assume a fixed pattern
length of four but the framework can accommodate variable length patterns. With
the additional data elements added during an attack, even if they are a copy of the
existing data elements, the encoded sequence gets disrupted. The receiver expects a
message sequence of Green for data element D6 and Blue for data element D11, but
the algorithm detects the subsequently received elements do not have the expected
message sequence. Here, we assume that the receiver knows the length of expected
data elements. The sender and receiver can agree on a pre-defined range of values
for the length or have an increment counter in each data-element, etc. to get the
length. Knowing the encoded data element length along with the side information
received from a different sensor modality like the GPS timestamp, as mentioned in
section 4.3.1, will help the decoder to generate the encoded message pattern. Based
on the lengths of the encoded message sequence lencode and the decoded message se-
quence ldecode, the type of attack can be determined, i,e it can be determined that
the elements are added if ldecode > lencode. As shown in Algorithm 3, the decoded
message sequence is compared with the expected message sequence in an O(N) loop
to find out the location of newly added data elements. This algorithm assumes that
the added element’s pattern is different from its adjacent element. Figure 4.11 de-
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picts the performance of the algorithm in the presence of additive uniform noise.
The results show the robustness of the tamper detection algorithm and the proposed
data-hiding based framework performance in the presence of channel noise. The QIM
based methods can recover the watermark as long as the channel noise is confined to
the below equation.
d2min > 4 ·N · σ2n (4.7)
where σ is the standard deviation of channel noise, and N represents the number of
encoding bits or dimensions, and dmin represents the minimum distance between the
reconstruction points (Chen and Wornell, 1998). It can be observed from Figure 4.11
that the proposed framework can detect and localize the tampered data elements with
100% accuracy when the noise is within bounds as per Equation (4.7), for a given
step-size of ∆ = 1 cm.
4.4.2 Data Deletion
In this scenario, as shown in Figure 4.9, the attacker modifies the RADAR detec-
tions either by carefully eliminating chosen targets or by deleting random elements.
A typical delete attack scenario is represented in Figure 4.9, the data elements D6 and
D11 are deleted from the original sequence of the RADAR data. This decreases the
total count of elements from n to n− 2. In the proposed method, the sender embeds
the message pattern generated from the GPS timestamp in the position information
(x, y) of the data elements. The message pattern is represented by color-code (Red,
Green, Blue, and White) in Figure 4.9. When the data elements get deleted, the mes-
sage embedding sequence gets disrupted. The receiver expects a message sequence of
Green for data element D6 and Blue for data element D11, but it can detect that the
received elements D7 and D12 respectively do not have the expected pattern. Based
on the lengths of the encoded message sequence lencode and the decoded message se-
quence ldecode, the type of attack can be determined, i,e it can be determined that the
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elements are deleted if ldecode < lencode.
The tamper localization algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2. The decoded mes-
sage sequence is compared with the expected message sequence in an O(N) loop to
determine the location of the deleted data elements. The results of the algorithm are
shown in Figure 4.11. The algorithm detects and localizes the delete attack vector
with 100% accuracy as long as the noise is bounded by Equation (4.7). It can be
observed from Figure 4.11 that as the noise variance increases, the accuracy falls for
a given step-size.
Figure 4.9: Data deletion attack vector depiction
4.4.3 Data Modification
During a data modification attack, as shown in Figure 4.10, the attacker modifies
the RADAR detections by altering the existing data element content. Figure 4.10
represents a typical data modification attack. The data elements D6 and D11 are
modified in the original sequence of the RADAR data. This type of attack does not
change the total count of elements. In the proposed method, the sender embeds a
message pattern generated from GPS timestamp, as explained in section 4.3.1, into the
position information (x, y) of the data elements. The message pattern is represented
by color-code (Red, Green, Blue, and White) in Figure 4.10. When the data elements
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get modified, the embedded message sequence gets disrupted. The receiver expects a
message sequence of Green for data element D6 and Blue for data element D11 and
detects that the received data elements do not have the expected pattern. To get the
location of the modified data elements, as shown in Algorithm 1, the decoded message
sequence is compared with the expected message sequence in an O(N) loop. The
accuracy of the algorithm is represented in Figure 4.11. This algorithm assumes that
random elements are modified within a given message pattern, and the channel noise
is less than the step size. It is observed from Figure 4.11 that as the noise variance
increases, the localization accuracy of the algorithm decreases. However, when the
noise is within bounds, the detection and localization accuracy of the modified data
elements is 100%. Similar to the trend observed in the other two algorithms.
Figure 4.10: Data modification attack vector depiction
4.5 Experiments & Results
4.5.1 Impact of Embedding Distortion on Object Detection
Though the data-hiding based sensor integrity framework is computationally less
complex than the traditional cryptography, one of the major concerns with the
method is the embedding induced distortion as the watermark is embedded directly
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into the data by altering it. A question arises whether the end application or the
consumer of this data can handle this distortion. An answer to this question would
help the automotive industry adopt the watermarking techniques for sensor data or
other data integrity verification applications. In this study, we analyze the effects of
embedding RADAR data using the proposed 2D QIM data hiding framework on a
sensor fusion algorithm. The sensor fusion method we use for this study is EKF. In
autonomous vehicles, Kalman filters are used to estimate the state of any dynamic
system, such as position estimation of moving objects on the road. In doing so,
the Kalman filter only needs current observations and previous predictions, hence
Kalman filter is a light-weight fusion algorithm (Jetto et al., 1999), (Rigatos, 2010),
(Madhavan and Schlenoff, 2003). They are also good at handling the measurement
inaccuracies in the sensors, i.e., sensor noise. The EKF based sensor fusion algorithm
takes inputs from two or more sensors and generates a combined prediction of the
tracked object at every time step. The impact of the proposed 2D QIM method for
sensor data integrity verification is estimated based on the output of the EKF. As
explained in section 4.2.1, in this experiment, we use measurements from two onboard
vehicle sensors LiDAR and RADAR to estimate the state of a pedestrian moving in-
front of the car. The same object, in this case, a pedestrian, will be detected by the
two sensors, and a Kalman filter fuses the data and predicts the accurate position of
the pedestrian.
To predict the position of a target, a Kalman filter uses a motion or process model
that estimates the future location of the target or object of interest. In this chapter,
we use a constant velocity motion model as a baseline for target motion estimation.
The motion model, as depicted in Figure 4.3, predicts the position and velocity of the
pedestrian at a future time tk+1, based on the values at time-step tk. This position
information is provided as a 2D position and velocity vector called the state vector.
In the context of this chapter, the state vector consists of the predicted position and
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velocity of the pedestrian represented as
Figure 4.11: Tamper localization algorithm performance under varying channel noise
x = [px py vx vy]
T (4.8)
where (px, py) are (x, y) components of pedestrian position and (vx, vy) are (x, y)
components of his velocity at a given time step tk. The Kalman filter consists of
prediction and update steps. In the prediction step, the state vector x
′
at next time
step tk is estimated along with the uncertainty P
′
based on values of x and P at
previous time step tk−1 and the motion model. During the update step, for every new
measurement at time tk, the estimation function performs the measurement update.
The deterministic part of the prediction step F is the state transition matrix. The
uncertainty measure P is a stochastic process modeled as random noise that affects
the prediction step. The state vector x
′
can be estimated as
x
′
= f(x, µ) (4.9)
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= FPF T +Q (4.10)
where F is the state transition matrix that models state transitions from previous
Figure 4.12: RMSE comparison at Rm = 0.4
time step tk−1 to current time tk, µ is the added noise, Q is the process co-variance
matrix that models the stochastic part of the state transition function. A linear
motion model with constant velocity is used to define the state transition matrix F .




= ptk−1 + vtk−1 ∗ δt (4.11)
where δt = tk − tk−1 and since the model assumes constant velocity, the velocity at





based on the above model, the Kalman filter uses the estimated state to predict the
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pedestrian position. In the update step, the sensor measurements are used to correct
Figure 4.13: RMSE comparison at Rm = 0.5
the predicted states and to obtain more accurate estimates. In the measurement




The measurement step that precedes the update step relies on the measurement
model, measurement matrix H, and covariance matrix R to correctly estimate the
measurement vector z. The measurement matrix is required to transform the mea-
surement vector z to the state vector as shown in Equation (4.8). The measurement
function can be represented as
z = Hx+ ω (4.14)
where H is the measurement matrix that projects object position belief into the
measurement space of the sensor and ω is the measurement error that encompasses
all the uncertainties in measurements from the sensor represented as a Gaussian
with zero mean and covariance matrix R, ω ≈ N(0, R). Assuming the measurement
components are not cross-correlated, the covariance matrix R becomes a diagonal
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matrix. The dimensionality of R depends on the size of the measurement vector
z, which is two for LiDAR and three for RADAR in our case. Hence, R becomes
a 3X3 diagonal matrix for RADAR and a 2X2 diagonal matrix for LiDAR. The
measurement matrix H also differs based on the sensors used by the fusion algorithm.
Since LiDAR measures the position of the target in the Cartesian coordinates (x, y),
the state vector to measurement vector transition is linear, and calculation of the
measurement matrix H is straightforward. It just needs to discard the velocity from
the state vector. Hence during the update step, standard Kalman filter transitions are
applied for LiDAR measurements. In the case of RADAR, the transition is non-linear
as RADAR measures ρ, φ, ρ̇ of the target. During the update step, to handle the non-
linear measurement functions for RADAR measurements, we use the EKF concept.
Kalman filters are linear estimators, the extension of this idea to non-linear systems
is called extended Kalman filter (EKF) (Madhavan and Schlenoff, 2003). In EKF,
the non-linear state and observation equations are linearized using Jacobian matrices.
Hence for RADAR sensor Jacobian of H is computed to get the linear approximation.
Once the z is computed, the update step or correction step is performed where the
latest measurements are used to update the state estimates and their uncertainties
as following:
y = z −Hx′ (4.15)
Here y is the error value or the difference between the prediction and actual measure-









After the computation of the Kalman gain, the predictions are updated using the




P = (I −KH)P ′ (4.19)
It can be observed that in an EKF, the uncertainty in both the process and
measurements are taken into consideration. In general, the measurement uncertainty
or the measurement noise covariance matrix R in Equation (4.14), is the inherent
sensor behavior and hence provided by the sensor manufacturer. Whereas, the process
uncertainty Q in Equation (4.10), is defined based on the motion model and other
application related assumptions. If we use the EKF as the sensor fusion algorithm,
three configuration parameters can affect the algorithm outcome in the proposed
framework. The first being the measurement noise matrix R, the second the overall
process noise Q, and the third, the embedding step-size ∆. In this experiment, we
analyze the impact of the watermark embedding using the 2D QIM method on the
sensor fusion algorithm’s output under different configuration scenarios. We use two
types of RADAR data as an input to the EKF algorithm that predicts the state vector
of the pedestrian. The first type is the clean and unmodified data, and the second
type is 2D QIM modified data. The resulting predictions from EKF are compared
against the ground truth position vectors in both the cases using the Root Mean
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where xgtt & x
pred
t are the ground truth and predicted position vectors respectively at
a given time t and n is the length of data. The RMSE value is used to determine
the accuracy of the prediction. Low RMSE value indicates that the sensor fusion
algorithm predicted the tracked object position accurately throughout the track path.
The RMSE values of position vector (px, py) predictions generated from clean and
watermarked inputs to the EKF are shown in Figure 4.12 & 4.13.
The measurement input to EKF has a measurement noise component which is
dependent on the intrinsic electronic characteristics of the sensor. This can be repre-
sented as an additive Gaussian noise ω as shown in Equation (4.14). The measurement
noise covariance R represents the deviation of the sensor measured values from the
true values. This deviation is estimated during the calibration phase by the sensor
manufacturer. In the absence of the sensor manufacturer data, it can also be esti-
mated using analytical methods (Park et al., 2019). To accurately compensate for
the measurement noise in an EKF the R value for a given sensor must be known or
estimated to be used in Equation (4.14).
If we consider ωRm ≈ N(0, Rm) as the known or measured measurement un-
certainty and ωRn ≈ N(0, Rn) as the overall measurement uncertainty used in the
sensor fusion EKF algorithm in Equation (4.14), an EKF provides accurate predic-
tions when the value of Rn ≥ Rm. Here, it is always better to keep the Rn & Rm
values close to each other. If the EKF requires an inflated Rn value to incur cor-
rect predictions then it could be concealing other issues in the measurements like
measurement outliers and non-Gaussian nature of the noise. The measurement un-
certainty values used in the EKF ωRn can be represented as a combination of two
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or more different noise distributions with data satisfying the i.i.d criteria. Let’s say,
ωR1n ≈ N(0, R
1
n) and ωR2n ≈ N(0, R
2
n) are two different noise distributions that con-
tributed to the overall noise ωRn , then the resulting distribution can be represented
as:





The RMSE results depicted in Figure 4.12 & 4.13 show that the 2D QIM embed-
ded RADAR data can be considered as an added random noise contributor to the
overall measurement uncertainty and it can be represented by R1n or R
2
n in Equa-
tion (4.21). In this experiment, the RMSE values for clean and 2D QIM embedded
RADAR data are calculated at different measurement noise covariance matrix val-
ues Rm ∈ (0.4, 0.5), Rn ∈ (0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6) and varying embedded step sizes
∆ ∈ (0.01, 0.05, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1, 2) m. Considering the Rm as the measurement
error covariance provided by the sensor manufacturer, the EKF which accepts this
RADAR sensor data should use a covariance matrix value Rn above or equal to the
Rm uncertainty. It can be observed from Figure 4.12, when Rn ≥ Rm, the RMSE
values of position vector for the 2D QIM embedded data is less than or equal to
the RMSE values from clean data for step-size ∆ < 0.75 m. With a given range
of px ≈ 18.5 m & py ≈ 12.5 m in the data under test, the results show that the
fusion algorithm can recover from position data perturbations of up-to 6%. As the
Rn value goes below the Rm, the RMSE of encoded data is less than the clean data
only when ∆ < 0.05 m. This shows that the embedding induced distortion at higher
step sizes is acting like additional uncompensated noise and introduces prediction
errors. Similar results are observed for the state vector predictions in case of data
with measurement covariance matrix value Rm = 0.5, as shown in Figure 4.13. It
can be inferred from the results that in the case where the measurement covariance
Rn < Rm, as the embedding step-size increases, the measurement noise value in-
creases, and hence the predictions of the embedded data elements are off. But as the
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Rn value is increased above the Rm, the embedding induced distortion is gracefully
handled by the fusion algorithm, and we observe low RMSE values even at larger
step sizes. This phenomenon can be explained by Equation (4.21). Here the embed-
ded induced distortion acts like an additive Gaussian noise component. The inherent
randomness in the watermark generation and embedding, which acts as noise, adds
up to the randomness in the sensor noise. These two noises are independent of each
other; hence the resultant effect is additive. This increases the RMSE value of the
prediction error when the fusion algorithm does not consider and compensate for this
additional noise. These experiments, when repeated at different permissible values of
process noise covariance matrix Q > 0, showed similar results.
Apart from the embedding induced distortion analysis, two different experiments
are conducted to measure the other performance parameters of the detection frame-
work, such as the bit error rate and the false alarm rate.
4.5.2 Bit Error Rate
In this experiment we analyze the errors in the decoded bit stream in the presence
of channel noise. The decoder step in the proposed framework generates a binary
message stream Mx,y = {m1x,y,m2x,y, · · · ,mNx,y}, from the RADAR data elements.
The bit error rate BER is calculated by comparing each bit in the decoded message
mix,y ∈ {mix,miy} with the embedded bit m̂ix,y as follows:
BER =
∑n
i=1 Imix,y 6= m̂ix,y
n
(4.22)
where I is the indicator function, and n is the size of the decoded message bitstream.
When no additional noise is added to the RADAR data elements, the BER is close
to 8.6%, which corresponds to the noise due to the attack vectors. As the channel
noise modeled by an uniform distribution is added to the data, the BER stays below
9.5% for the noise variance σ < ∆/5.65, for a given step-size ∆. As the noise vari-
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ance increases beyond the threshold in Equation (4.7), the BER value increases as
shown in Table. 4.1. It can be observed that the robustness to the channel noise is
directly proportional to the step-size ∆, which-in turn is directly proportional to the
embedding induced distortion.








Table 4.1: BER and False-Alarm rate at different noise levels
4.5.3 False-alarm Rate Analysis
The false alarm rate analysis is another important performance indicator of the
proposed framework. It measures the number of data-elements the framework de-
termines as tampered when it is provided with clean or unmodified data. In this
experiment, the framework is tested with a combination of clean and modified data
elements, and the false alarm rate fAlarmRate is calculated as follows:
fAlarmRate = NFalsePositive/NDataElements (4.23)
where, NFalsePositive is the number of data elements the framework falsely classified
as tampered with and NDataElements is the total number of data elements tested. The
experiment is repeated at different levels of the additive uniform noise to replicate
the channel noise. The results are shown in Table 4.1. It can be observed that
the fAlarmRate stayed at 0% when the uniform noise variance σ < dmin/(2 ∗
√
(N)),
where dmin = ∆/2, N = 2 in our framework. As the noise variance increases beyond
this threshold the false positives increase resulting in a higher false alarm rate. It
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can be concluded from these results that when the channel noise is within acceptable
bounds, our framework can achieve 100% detection accuracy with zero false positives.
To summarize the findings, the proposed 2D QIM based integrity verification pipeline
Figure 4.14: Comparison: EKF path prediction from clean and encoded data at Rm
= 0.5, Rn = 0.5 & ∆ = 0.01 m
is tested for the affects of embedding induced distortion using simulated RADAR data
on an EKF based sensor fusion algorithm. The experimental results conclude that
the 2D QIM method for watermarking has a little or no effect on the EKF predictions
for small values of quantization step-size ∆ ≤ 0.05 m, which can be attributed to the
minimal distortion induced by the 2D QIM process. A visual representation of the
tracked path by sensor fusion EKF algorithm for both plain and encoded inputs at a
small step-size ∆ = 0.01 m is displayed in Figure. 4.14. It can be observed that the
predicted state-vectors for both the plain and 2D QIM embedded inputs are similar
even when the actual measurement noise covariance Rm and the EKF considered
noise covariance Rn are same. As the step size increases, the overall measurement
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noise covariance used in the EKF, Rn need to take into account the noise generated
by the 2D QIM embedding to get accurate results, this phenomenon is shown in
Figure. 4.12, 4.13. Other experiments to measure the tamper localization accuracy
and noise resilience of the proposed framework show that the proposed framework
works well if the channel noise of the interface is within theoretical bounds presented
in Equation. 4.7. The tamper localization accuracy of our framework is close to 100%
when the interface noise is zero.
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CHAPTER V
LiDAR Data Integrity Verification-3D QIM
Deterministic perception of the surrounding environment is both crucial and a
challenging task for autonomous vehicles. A wide range of sensors, including LiDAR,
RADAR, cameras, and so on, are used to build the perception layer of an autonomous
vehicle. Many interfaces, such as OBD-II, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, cellular networks, etc.,
have been introduced in autonomous vehicles to control various functionalities, in-
cluding V2X communications, over-the-air updates, security, remote vehicle-health
monitoring, and so on. These interfaces are introducing new attack surfaces that
can be exploited via external as well as internal attacks. Attackers have successfully
demonstrated how to exploit these attack surfaces by crafting attack vectors to launch
both insider and external attacks. The sensor and sensor data are also vulnerable to
both external and insider attacks. Developing safeguards against these attacks is a
steppingstone toward the design and development of reliable autonomous vehicles.
For instance, failure to detect and localize sensor data tampering can result in an er-
roneous perception of the environment and lead to wrong path-planning and control
decisions. We propose a novel semi-fragile data hiding-based technique for real-time
sensor data integrity verification and tamper detection and localization. Specifically,
the proposed data hiding-based method relies on 3-dimensional quantization index
modulation (QIM)-based data hiding to insert a binary watermark into the LiDAR
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data at the sensing layer, which is used for integrity verification and tamper detec-
tion and localization at the decision-making unit, e.g., the advanced driver assistance
system (ADAS). The performance of the proposed scheme is evaluated on a bench-
marking LiDAR dataset. The impact of information hiding on the object-recognition
algorithm is also evaluated. Experimental results indicate that the proposed method
can successfully detect and localize data tampering attacks, such as fake object inser-
tion (FOI) and target object deletion (TOD). Robustness to noise-addition attacks is
also evaluated.
5.1 Introduction
Sensors feed the sensor fusion core in an autonomous vehicle with environment
data. If the input to the sensor fusion core is compromised, the resulting decisions
down the understand-and-act pipeline would be erroneous and could result in sig-
nificant damage. Though some redundancy could be built throughout the system
by fusing different sensor information, the computational cost of path planning and
other control algorithms to work around and ignore the tampered sensor data is much
higher than detecting the tampering at the sensor level. It can be observed from Fig-
ure 1.2 that given a vehicle architecture in which a sensor transmits raw data to the
vehicle for data interpretation, an attacker can exploit vehicle attack surfaces to tam-
per with the raw sensor data by simple operations like fake object insertion (FOI) or
target object deletion (TOD) to dupe the object information extractor and the per-
ception estimation applications that are down the pipeline. By inserting tampered
data containing fake objects or by deleting existing objects an attacker can influence
the perception and localization algorithms to consider and act on the tampered data.
This would result in the ADAS making wrong control decisions like decelerating or
braking when it is not supposed to or driving right into a target object. These wrong
control decisions can pose a serious safety threat to the occupants of an autonomous
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vehicle. Integrity verification of sensor data before acting on it is crucial.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the data hiding-based integrity verification
methods for sensor data, a 3-dimensional quantization index modulation (3D-QIM) is
implemented on LiDAR sensor point cloud data. Simplicity, low embedding/decoding
complexity, quantifiable embedding distortion as a function of embedding parameter
∆, and detection performance as a function of channel distortion and embedding
parameters are the salient features of QIM-based data hiding, which is the main
motivation behind selecting it over the other information-hiding methods (Malik et al.,
2008), (Chen and Wornell, 2001). The proposed method could be easily adapted into
other 3D point-cloud data generators like RADAR, red-green-blue-depth (RGBD)
cameras, etc.
5.2 LiDAR Point Cloud: Applications
The LiDAR sensor plays a key role in an autonomous-driving vehicle due to its
ability to provide better perception in all light conditions in comparison to other sen-
sors like digital cameras. Adverse weather conditions like fog and rain could reduce
the accuracy of the data, but in moderate weather conditions, LiDAR is well suited
for high-frequency applications such as building a perception layer for an autonomous
vehicle. High-end LiDARs could generate detailed local maps of an ego vehicle work-
ing in all light conditions. These maps could be used for a variety of critical tasks such
as behavior predictions of the surrounding vehicles and environment. This environ-
mental behavior prediction, such as whether a vehicle ahead is making a turn or not,
helps a self-driving vehicle in predictive path planning. Typically, LiDARs are used in
medium-range {80 to 160 m} applications such as collision avoidance and pedestrian
detection and also in long-range {160 to 300 m} applications like adaptive cruise con-
trol and critical object tracking. A smart LiDAR is equipped with integrated ECUs to
perform pre-processing, object-recognition (detection and classification), and track-
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ing functions and provides a list of tracked objects to a control system. On the other
hand, a simple LiDAR provides a raw point cloud, and the object recognition and
tracking are performed in the ADAS ECU, as shown in Figure 1.2. The choice of
the type of LiDAR depends on autonomous vehicle architecture and functional safety
requirements. For this research, we focus on autonomous vehicle systems built on
LiDARs that provide a raw point cloud.
The LiDAR data returns have no shape attributes, as they represent the perceived
environment. The density of the point cloud depends on the horizontal and vertical
angular resolution of the LiDAR. For automotive applications in general, the point
cloud is sparse, as the points are spread across the maximum range of the LiDAR,
which could be up to 300 m. Each point in the point cloud is usually represented
by its Cartesian coordinates and the intensity of reflection. In autonomous vehicle
applications, most of the existing object detection and tracking models do not consider
the intensity of reflection; hence, that value is neglected. The 3D point cloud is
considered as a set of points pc = {p1, p2, p3..pn}, where each point is the combination
of its x, y, z components pi = {pix, piy, piz}.
5.2.1 QIM-based Data Hiding on LiDAR Point Cloud
Any given sample in a LiDAR dataset is the combination of the reflection intensity
of a point in space and its corresponding 3D location coordinates. Since we are
focusing on autonomous vehicle applications, the primary usage of LiDAR data would
be in the areas of perception and localization. These applications require distance
measurements to the detected objects in the LiDAR point cloud. In performing object
detection on the raw LiDAR point cloud, the general norm is to reduce the redundancy
and bring in fixed connectivity between the points and then feed this sensor data to
a prediction model. Most of these prediction models are deep-learning-based, where
the model extracts features based on the training data set. The existing prediction
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models cannot detect LiDAR point-cloud tampering. Cryptographic- or data hiding-
based approaches can be developed to solve this problem. It can be observed from
Figure 1.4 that the data hiding-based solution outperforms the cryptographic-based
solution as far as latency is concerned. The challenge for the data hiding-based
integrity verification method for automotive and robotic applications is to ensure that
message embedding distortion should not deteriorate the performance of prediction
models used in the ADAS unit. The QIM-based data hiding provides the flexibility to
select a desired embedding distortion level as a function of the quantization parameter,
which is the main motivation behind selecting QIM over other available data-hiding
methods. In the following, we outline QIM-based data hiding for a LiDAR point
cloud.
The basic principle of quantizing the host signal using multiple quantizers, where
each one of them could be treated as a set of reconstruction points, can be extended to
a 3D point cloud such as LiDAR sensor data (Joachim and Bernd, 2002). The point
samples from the LiDAR sensor are randomly located by default and lack connectivity
information. To give them shape and connectivity aspects, the point cloud is divided
into fixed-size voxels. A voxel is a fixed-width cube in 3D space. Once the maximum
range of the point samples from the sensor is determined, points are quantized with
a specific step size ∆. After this quantization step, all the points that fall within
a voxel are represented either by a fixed vertex of the corresponding voxel or by its
centroid. This voxelization step also reduces the redundancy in reflections from the
same target.
After voxelization, all the points of the signal S, with position vectors that fall
within a voxel k are represented by the vertex at the origin of the voxel vk =






Figure 5.1: Illustration of 3D QIM-based data hiding, here axis representation is in
LiDAR frame
Extending the QIM based data-hiding method from section 3.4 to a 3D point cloud
gives the ability to embed multiple bits in each point. We implement a simple form
of the lattice QIM using the 3D cubic base lattice. Data is hidden in the spatial
domain by modifying the three-dimensional position vector of each point; hence, we
have three degrees of freedom in the selection of reconstruction points as shown in
Figure 5.1. The non-intersecting nature of the reconstruction points results in host-
signal interference rejection (Chen and Wornell, 1998). Based on the hidden message
tuple, mk, to be embedded, here mk = {mxk,myk,mzk} the vertex can be moved
around a fixed inner cube of a given dither size. The resulting watermarked signal
for 3D QIM can be represented as:
sw(svk ,mk) = qmk(svk ,∆) (5.2)
107













If we embedded three bits per host-signal sample to take advantage of the three-
dimensional spread of points, with the embedding rate R = 3 bits/sample, the em-
bedded message mk would assume 2
R values. The range of mk determines the count
of the ensemble of quantizers hence the quantizer ensemble will have eight values
qi ∈ {q1, q2, q3, · · · , q8} in this case. Each one of these eight quantizers shifts the
vertex point at A in Figure 5.1 to one of the eight vertices {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h} within
the inner cube. If, for example, all the points of a 3D point cloud are arranged in
sequential order, Figure 5.1 represents the first two voxels of the point cloud. If the
point cloud is quantized with a step-size ∆, the points within these first two voxels
are represented by vertices A and C. In the proposed 3D QIM method, the position
of the vertex is moved within an inner hypercube of size ∆/2 based on the embedded
message, which is the sequence number of the voxel, i.e., 0 or 1. This shift in the
vertex position is depicted by the red circle in Figure 5.1. The proposed method of
moving the vertex within an inner hypercube does not increase the vertex count in
comparison to a normal quantization and hence does not introduce any additional
transmission overhead.
5.3 Attack Modeling
Attacks on LiDAR sensors used in autonomous vehicle applications such as local-
ization and perception can be broadly divided into two categories:
1. Regular-channel attacks at sensor level: Sensor saturation, spoofing.
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Figure 5.2: Block diagram of the proposed QIM-based framework
2. Transmission-channel attacks at interface level: Point cloud tampering or de-
formation.
Regular-channel attacks such as sensor saturation (flooding the target with bright
light) and relay and replay attacks (capturing and re-sending the target LiDAR pulse
sequence) can be launched external to the vehicle but need precise knowledge of the
target LiDAR pulse sequence, receiving angles, and listening time interval (Shin et al.,
2017), (Petit et al., 2015). These attacks could be nullified by introducing some
pre-processing steps like random probing, correlation, and voting-based confidence
estimators. The proposed data hiding-based method is unable to detect regular-
channel attacks.
For transmission-channel attacks, which can be launched from inside the vehicle,
creating a fake scene could be as simple as copying or deleting a section of the point
cloud at the desired location. These insider attacks can be launched with ease in real-
time and can have a maximum impact on vehicle decision making if the ADAS core
algorithms are designed on the assumption that the sensor data is credible. Most
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of the object-detection and classification algorithms in the data analysis pipeline
are deep-learning-based and are run or inferenced in real-time. These deep-learning
models do not differentiate between a fake object and a real object, which could result
in erroneous object detections on tampered data. In this section, we describe the
attack model for transmission-channel attacks. Transmission-channel attacks happen
at the edge system when a hacker gets access to the network interfaces or the decision-
making control unit. A hacker could modify the data or point cloud in real-time by
some simple operations like copying the existing targets from the point cloud and
pasting them in the direct path of the vehicle, which could prompt the vehicle to come
to a sudden halt. If the point-cloud tampering is not detected before the inference
engine runs on the raw data, it will put more burden on the decision-making logic
(the ADAS unit) as it has to incorporate more checks and balances, thus increasing
the processing time. Moreover, the ADAS outputs are also expected to be wrong.
If we could detect and localize tampering in real-time, then that would ensure the
integrity of the sensor data and therefore guarantee the expected ADAS performance.
5.3.1 Attack Vectors
Similar to the attack vectors discussed in Section 4.4, for LiDAR data We have
identified two main attack vectors for transmission-channel attacks, which require
not only the detection of tampering but also the specific location of the tampering to
neglect that area in the decision-making process.
1. Fake Object Insertion (FOI): A fake target is inserted in the direct path of
the vehicle.
2. Target Object Deletion (TOD): An existing target in the path of the vehicle
is removed.
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5.4 Countermeasures to Transmission Channel Attacks
To counter the above-mentioned attack scenarios on the transmission channel
between the LiDAR sensor and the ADAS, we propose a QIM-based data-hiding
method for tamper detection and localization. Shown in Figure 5.2 is the block
diagram of the proposed method. We divide the framework into an information-hiding
processing block at the LiDAR sensor unit and a point-cloud verification and tamper-
detection and localization processing block in the ADAS unit. The information-
hiding processing framework that is implemented inside the sensor embeds a binary
watermark in the raw point cloud, introducing a negligible distortion. After this step,
the embedded point cloud is transmitted over the vehicle network. The watermarked
point cloud can be directly worked on by the ADAS core to detect and track objects.
The integrity-verification processing block runs in parallel to perform integrity checks
on the point cloud data in real-time and inputs its decision to the ADAS unit. This
verification-processing block localizes the tampered region once it determines that
the point cloud is tampered. This approach secures the point cloud against any
transmission-channel-intrusion insider attacks, which are hard to detect at the data
inference stage.
5.4.1 Implementation Details
In the QIM-based information-hiding processing framework, which runs in close
vicinity to the physical sensor, the LiDAR point cloud is filtered to capture forward-
looking points or the front camera view. This step can be skipped if the surround-view
point cloud is required by the application. The resulting points are quantized based
on the predefined step size ∆. After basic quantization, each voxel vertex is shifted to
one of the eight positions at a minimum distance of ∆/2 based on a binary message
vector as discussed in section 5.2.1. For simplicity in this study, a repeating message
sequence ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} was chosen. At each sample with index i the message
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value is given by m = i (mod (8)). The computational complexity of the implemented
algorithm is O(3N) for N samples, as embedding each bit per sample is O(1).
For the point-cloud verification framework, a blind watermark extraction mecha-
nism is used, that is, the original point cloud is not used for the watermark extraction
process. In the verification block, the embedded message is extracted by quantizing
the received signal with the same step-size ∆/2 and selecting the nearest reconstruc-
tion point. For simplicity, we have assumed that the verification block is aware of the
repeating message-embedding pattern. If a dynamic message embedding is needed,
the required pattern can be communicated to the verification block at the receiver
end through any selected vehicle interface, as shown in the Figure 5.2.
Based on the correlation values and pattern matching between the embedded and
extracted messages, the indices of the received signal where the embedded and ex-
tracted messages do not match are determined. From these indices, the corresponding
LiDAR frame points are traced and localized as tampered. To measure the accuracy
of tamper localization, the Hausdorff distance (Agarwal and Prabhakaran, 2009) is
computed between the bounding boxes of the points detected as tampered against
the bounding boxes of the ground truth data points.
5.4.2 Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of the proposed framework, we used KITTI vision
benchmark data collected using a 64-channel Velodyne HDL-64E LiDAR running
at 10 Hz (Geiger et al., 2012). The KITTI offers a sensor synchronized and labeled
dataset with the location information of the objects in the data frame. The majority of
deep-learning-based object detection and classification models in automated driving
domain rely on this dataset for training and performance benchmarking. We also
chose this dataset to evaluate the performance of the proposed integrity verification
and tamper-resistant methods to keep the analysis as close as possible to
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real-world autonomous driving scenarios.
A fake object insertion (FOI) is simulated on the fly by copying a real target
object’s points from the LiDAR frame at a different location. Similarly, the other
attack vector of target object deletion (TOD) is also simulated by removing points
in the frame that represents a real labeled target object. These two techniques could
be combined to move the targets to a different location, which could be considered as
another attack vector. A sample representation of the LiDAR data from the KITTI
dataset is shown in Figure 5.3. It visualizes the fake object insertion and known target
deletion along with accurate detection and localization. To further understand the
effects of channel noise, random Gaussian noise of varying variance is added globally
to the LiDAR frame.
The minimum distance dmin between two reconstruction points measures the size
of the noise vector that can be tolerated by the system (Chen and Wornell, 1998). If
we set a limit on message embedding distortion by choosing a fixed quantization step
size ∆ or, in other words, set a constraint that the composite signal in Equation (5.6)
should be closely equal to the svk ∀mk, then the message detection accuracy would
be high when channel noise is bounded by Equation (4.7). Our experimental results
confirmed that the proposed algorithm adheres to this theoretical noise limit.
5.5 Experimental Results
The performance of the proposed framework is evaluated on KITTI’s 3D object
detection benchmark training dataset. For performance evaluation, LiDAR frames
with cars in close proximity to the ego vehicle with no occlusions and less truncation
are selected. The motivation behind this selection criteria is to aid the visual in-
spection of the simulated FOI and TOD attack vectors and to precisely evaluate the
tamper localization accuracy in a controlled environment. To this end, the first 1000
frames of KITTI’s dataset are analyzed that resulted in 67 frames satisfying selection
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(a) Camera view of LiDAR frame
(b) LiDAR frame clean
(c) QIM-modulated LiDAR frame
(d) Tamper: Fake car added
(e) Detection: Fake car located
(f) Tamper: Car removed
(g) Detection: Deleted car located
Figure 5.3: Attack models and tamper detection and localization results
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criteria. It is important to highlight that the proposed framework applies to all the
LiDAR frames in the KITTI’s dataset and the LiDAR frame selection criteria is not
the limitation of the proposed system. It is rather used to have a more meaningful
and fair performance analysis.
The performance of the proposed method is evaluated using four experiments,
ranging from investigating the impact on the object detection performance of the
ADAS unit of embedding induced distortion to embedding strength analysis and
robustness in the presence of additive noise.
5.5.1 Impact of Embedding Distortion on ADAS Performance
The primary goal of this experiment is to investigate the impact of embedding
distortion on ADAS functionality. Specifically, this experiment studies the impact
of QIM-based data hiding distortion on the performance of object detection and -
recognition algorithms. The motivation behind using an object detection algorithm
as a key performance indicator in this experiment is because it provides a direct error
measurement in terms of the distance between object(s) in the original point cloud
and corresponding object(s) in the watermarked point cloud. In other LiDAR appli-
cations such as simultaneous localization and mapping (SLAM) and object tracking
the message embedding distortion is estimated through indirect methods. In these
methods, distortion is estimated as sensor bias and often gets compensated for or
canceled based on the filters used in SLAM (Perera et al., 2003).
To verify the effect of embedding induced distortion on object detection, as a
first step, we ran inference on a selected KITTI dataset frame processed using 3D
QIM with nine different step sizes using a pre-trained 3D FCN deep-learning model
(Li, 2017). We used an existing implementation of the 3D FCN which was pre-
trained on raw KITTI data frames for this experiment (Tsuji, 2018). From the KITTI
training data set, we selected a frame in which a target vehicle is within a 50 m
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range with zero heading angle. The selected frame is processed using 3D-QIM with
nine different step-sizes ∆ ∈ {1, 4, 6, 8, 10, 30, 40, 50 cm}. The resulting frames are
run individually through the 3D FCN deep-learning model inference engine, and the
resulting bounding box prediction is compared with the ground-truth bounding box.
The deviation in terms of the Hausdorff distance between the ground truth and the
predicted bounding boxes is compared. The results depicted in Table 5.1, show that
the inferencing of the deep-learning model resulted in good accuracy for a step-size
of 30 cm and below. It can be observed from Figure 5.4 that the shape of the raw
point cloud shown in Figure 5.4 (a) with a distinguishable car in the red bounding
box (ground truth) deteriorates as we increase the step size ∆. It can be observed
that the green bounding box corresponding to the model prediction starts moving
away from the red box corresponding to the ground truth as the step-size increases
beyond 30 cm. As we move farther, with the 64-channel LiDAR data, the number
of points representing a target becomes much smaller and falls into single digits.
For those labels, we observed a variation in prediction from the raw frame to the
QIM-modulated frame even at a smaller ∆ = 5 cm. Since the probability of false
alarms is high for objects with low reflection points, they are generally filtered by
the decision-making process. The range at which this filtering occurs depends on the
LiDAR resolution.










Table 5.1: QIM-induced distortion at different step-sizes
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(a) Camera view of LiDAR point cloud
(b) LiDAR: Raw point cloud
(c) QIM-modulated point cloud with ∆ = 5 cm
(d) QIM-modulated point cloud with ∆ = 8 cm
(e) QIM-modulated point cloud with ∆ = 30 cm
(f) QIM-modulated point cloud with ∆ = 35 cm
(g) QIM-modulated point cloud with ∆ = 50 cm
Figure 5.4: Bounding box estimation of a ground truth label at different QIM-
embedding step sizes
117












Table 5.2: VoxelNet: Car detection average precision scores
To further understand the effect of message embedding induced distortion on
LiDAR object detection accuracy, we tested watermarked LiDAR frames on another
3D object detection model called VoxelNet (Zhou and Tuzel, 2017). VoxelNet is
an end to end deep learning network that stacks the voxelization, convolution, and
region proposal network (RPN) operations to detect and localize objects from the
raw 3D LiDAR point cloud and its performance is claimed to be better than 3D FCN
(Zhou and Tuzel, 2017). The VoxelNet implementation determines object detection
precision based on the 70% overlap of the predicted 3D and 2D (bird’s eye view)
bounding boxes with their corresponding ground truth. In this experiment, we used
an existing implementation of the VoxelNet that is trained on KITTI benchmark
data to detect cars (Huang, 2018). We chose a validation set of 25 frames that fall
under the easy detection category defined by KITTI and ran inference on them using
a pre-trained model checkpoint. A base-line average precision score of VoxelNet is
established by running inference on the selected validation set multiple times. Same
set of 25 LiDAR frames watermarked using 3D-QIM with different step-sizes ∆ ∈
{1, 4, 6, 8, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 cm} are then generated. VoxelNet inference is executed on
each watermarked dataset to get the average precision score as shown in Table 5.2.
The first row (∆ = 0) of Table 5.2 shows the average precision of the model for raw
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data frames. For the raw data frames, the average precision of 2D and 3D detections
was 96.92% and 77.38% respectively.
It can be observed from Table 5.2 that for watermarked frames there is no sig-
nificant deterioration in the average precision of the model for up-to a step size of
8 cm. Within this range, the bird’s eye view detection scores had a mean of 96.85%
with a 0.51% standard deviation. The 3D detection scores averaged at 76.32% with a
standard deviation of 4.17%. The additional spread in 3D prediction scores in com-
parison to the 2D scores could be attributed to the fact that the 3D detection is a
more challenging task as it requires more accurate localization of shapes in 3D space
(Chen et al., 2017) and hence model needs to be trained on a larger data-set to be
able to generalize well. It can also be observed from Table 5.2 that for both methods,
the average precision score of the VoxelNet model decreases significantly as the step
size goes above 8 cm. Modifying the voxel dimensions of the model and training the
model on the modulated point cloud could improve the model performance in general.
Nevertheless, since our proposed data-hiding technique provides flexibility to select
the desired embedding distortion level as a function of the step-size, for any given
application an optimum step size could be selected based on the empirical evaluation
of the model and application needs.
5.5.2 Embedding Distortion Analysis
This experiment is designed to investigate the impact of single- vs multiple-bit
message embedding on tamper localization accuracy. Specifically, for a given step
size ∆ = 10 cm, we compared bounding box prediction results of the following three
QIM message embedding methods under various added noise levels:
1. 1D QIM with one-bit embedding along the x-axis
2. 2D QIM with two-bit embedding along x,y axes
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3. 3D QIM with three-bit embedding along x,y,z axes
Shown in Figure 5.5 is the performance of different bit-embedding methods in local-
izing the tampered area in a point cloud forged with FOI and global uniform noise.
It is observed that the tampered point localization accuracy decreased as the
additional uniform noise levels increased. For a given step size ∆ = 10 cm, the
tamper localization accuracy of 1D QIM is good up to an additional uniform noise
of σ = 2.5 cm, 2D QIM is good up to σ = 2.4 cm, and 3D QIM is good up to σ = 1.4 cm.
The noise tolerance values for a given ∆ are within the limits of the σ values for N = 1,
2, and 3 as per Equation (4.7). Figure 5.6 shows the performance of different bit-
embedding QIM methods in the presence of additional Gaussian noise. It is observed
that there is no significant difference in accuracy between multi- and single-bit
embedding.
One of the goals of the data hiding is to detect tampering under high lossy con-
ditions such as compression. The data-hiding method should detect any global in-
tentional attacks on the integrity of data such as sensor saturation by external noise
addition or affine transforms in multiple dimensions, along with local attacks like
FOI and TOD. Though single-bit embedding offers higher robustness to noise levels,
it will not detect targeted attacks in multiple dimensions. Hence, we propose using
3D QIM for autonomous vehicle applications.
5.5.3 Robustness Analysis
After choosing a range of step-sizes that result in acceptable embedding-induced
distortion to analyze the tamper detection and localization accuracy of the proposed
3D QIM method, three attributes are considered:
1. Bit error rate (BER) of embedding





Figure 5.5: Bounding box distortion analysis for different bit-embedding schemes un-





Figure 5.6: Bounding box distortion analysis for different bit-embedding schemes un-
der Gaussian additive noise attack
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3. Tamper detection false-alarm rate far
In different experiments, these three attributes were measured under various variance
levels of both uniform and Gaussian noise addition, along with analysis of the TOD
and FOI attack vectors and results.
5.5.3.1 Bit Error Rate
This experiment is designed to measure the performance of the proposed method
in terms of bit error rate (BER) in the presence of additive channel-noise. The output
of the message-decoding step in our method is a decoded message bit stream from
the received signal M̂ = { ̂m1, m̂2, · · · , m̂N }. In this experiment, the bit error rate 
is measured for each LiDAR frame after the decoding step, where each extracted
bit from the received LiDAR frame, m̂ i, is compared with the embedded message
bit as shown in Equation (4.22). To achieve this goal, Gaussian noise with different
standard deviations and uniform noise with different upper bounds are added into
watermarked point-cloud frames separately, and the impact of the additive noise
attack on BER performance is evaluated. For a clean QIM-modulated frame, the
BER is close to 0%. As we tamper with the data by the attack vectors FOI and
TOD, a constant BER of close to 2% is observed at zero added noise. As the added
noise value increases, the proposed three-bit QIM quantization method maintains a
bit error rate of less than 2%, for an added uniform noise of σ < ∆/6.93). This noise
threshold as defined by Equation (4.7) is {0.7, 2.9, 5.1 cm}, respectively, for step-sizes
of ∆ ∈ {5, 20, 35 cm}. It can be observed from Figure 5.7 that the BER values are
within acceptable bounds until the noise levels exceed the threshold defined by
Equation (4.7). The BER values go high at levels below the threshold bounds defined
by Equation (4.7) for added Gaussian white noise, as observed in Figure 5.8. This
change can be attributed to the 32% noise values falling outside the 1σ range in the
Gaussian distribution. Figures. 5.7, and 5.8 show the BER for one of the
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attack vectors, FOI. A similar trend is observed for the TOD attack vector.
5.5.3.2 Tamper Detection and Localization
This experiment aims to measure the accuracy of the tamper localization feature
of the proposed method and how the accuracy is affected by added channel noise. As
part of the decoding step, the indices of the tampered points are extracted from the
received frame. A bounding box enclosing these points is generated, and the corners
of this bounding box are compared with the corners of the ground-truth bounding
box provided by KITTI to get a measure of their proximity. We calculated the
Hausdorff distance between the two corner sets to measure the maximum distance of
a given vertex from the ground-truth bounding box to a similar vertex in the predicted
bounding box. Smaller values of this localization-distortion attribute suggest higher
accuracy of the prediction or, in other words, suggest that the proposed method can
draw a boundary across the tampered points accurately. We added Gaussian noise
with different standard deviations and uniform noise with different upper bounds to
the QIM-modulated frames and measured the effect of added noise on the performance
of the localization accuracy. The added noise is tested at varying levels of σ in the






(N)), ..., 2∆} and step-size ∆ in
range ∆ ∈ {5, 10, 20, 30, 35, 40 cm}, where N = 3 is the number of bits used for
embedding.
Shown in Figure 5.9 are the localization distortion box plots for the FOI attack
vector measured on point clouds with added uniform noise. It is observed that the
localization distortion is less than 2 cm as long as the noise level σ < dmin/(2∗
√
(N)),
where dmin = ∆/2 and N = 3. These results are in sync with the theoretical lim-
its given by Equation (4.7) and demonstrate that the proposed method can localize
tampering in the point cloud accurately in the presence of bounded noise. The perfor-
mance of the proposed method under added Gaussian noise is shown in Figure 5.10.
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(a) ∆ = 5 cm
(b) ∆ = 20 cm
(c) ∆ = 35 cm
Figure 5.7: Bit error rate of decoded code book for different step sizes and added
uniform noise
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(a) ∆ = 5 cm
(b) ∆ = 20 cm
(c) ∆ = 35 cm
Figure 5.8: Bit error rate of decoded code book for different step sizes and added
Gaussian noise
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For added Gaussian noise, we observed that the localization distortion is less than
2 cm as long as the noise level σ < dmin/(5 ∗
√
(N)), where dmin = ∆/2 and N = 3.
Again, this behavior of low robustness to noise can be attributed to the noise samples
that fall outside the 1σ range in Gaussian noise. Similar trends were observed for the
TOD attack vector.
5.5.3.3 False-alarm Rate Analysis
This experiment aims to measure the false-alarm rate of the proposed method in
detecting the tampered point cloud in the presence of additive noise as per Equa-
tion (4.23). In this experiment, we tracked the number of frames that our algorithm
falsely detected as tampered when it was given a clean frame.In this test, the tamper
detection false-alarm rate far stayed at 0% when there was no added channel noise.
In other words, the proposed model detected the presence of both the FOI and TOD
attack vectors accurately when there was no added channel noise. When noise was
added along with the attack vectors, for added uniform noise, far stayed at 0% for
σ < dmin/(2 ∗
√
(N)), where dmin = ∆/2, N = 3 and ∆ ∈ {5, 10, 20, 30, 35, 40 cm}.
As the noise σ level increased beyond that threshold, the far value jumped to
100%, as shown in Table 5.3. It is also observed that the far value increased to 100%
at lower thresholds of σ > dmin/(10 ∗
√
(N)) in the case of Gaussian added noise,
and this could be attributed to the noise values grater than 1σ. It can be observed
from Table 5.3 that at a given ∆ within acceptable distortion bound, the proposed
method can achieve 100% accurate detection and localization. A similar trend was
observed for the TOD attack vector. In automotive applications, the ethernet and
other local networks are not susceptible to high channel noise; hence, our proposed
method is expected to achieve the desired performance.
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(a) ∆ = 5 cm
(b) ∆ = 20 cm
(c) ∆ = 35 cm
Figure 5.9: Bounding box distortion in meters for different step sizes and added uni-
form noise
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(a) ∆ = 5 cm
(b) ∆ = 20 cm
(c) ∆ = 35 cm
Figure 5.10: Bounding box distortion in meters for different step sizes and added
Gaussian noise
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5.6 Vulnerability Analysis of QIM
The plain QIM framework proposed above has some security vulnerabilities due
to the use of plain QIM for embedding and plain text exchange of the embedded
message sequence. The effectiveness of data hiding schemes like QIM is measured
by their robustness against the message estimation attack. An estimation attack is
a process where the embedded message is estimated through the codebook or step-
size (∆). Accurate estimation of ∆ can lead to the estimation of embedded message
σ( cm) 0 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.4
∆ = 5 Gaussian 0 0.95 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
uniform 0 0 0 0 0 1.0
σ( cm) 0 1.2 1.4 1.9 2.9 5.8
∆ = 20 Gaussian 0 0.94 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
uniform 0 0 0 0 0 1.0
σ( cm) 0 2.0 2.5 3.4 5.1 10.1
∆ = 35 Gaussian 0 0.55 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
uniform 0 0 0 0 0 1.0
Table 5.3: False alarm rates at different step-sizes for added noise
features (Malik et al., 2008). The plain QIM method is more vulnerable to the
estimation attack when compared to dither QIM due to its regularity and predicted
outcome. This phenomenon is depicted in Figure 5.11, where-in a sample LiDAR
frame is embedded with a given message stream using both dither QIM and plain
QIM methods. It can be observed from Figure 5.11, that the plain QIM frame points
are regularly spaced where-as the dither QIM frame points display randomness in
spacing for a given step-size ∆ = 35 cm. This randomness adds more uncertainty
to watermark embedding hence making it more challenging to estimate. A relatively
simple step-size estimation algorithm proposed in (Malik et al., 2008) can estimate
the ∆ of QIM-stego images of varying message lengths and embedding rates with
100% accuracy. A similar approach would fail for the dither QIM stego image due to
the randomness in the quantization step-size. A similar pattern is observed even in
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the passive steganalysis approach using non-parametric methods like average entropy
estimation (Malik et al., 2008). The images embedded using normal QIM are detected
with high accuracy (0.2% false negatives) when compared to the images embedded
with dither QIM (7% false negatives).
(a) Clean LiDAR frame
(b) Dither modulated LiDAR frame
(c) Plain QIM modulated LiDAR frame
Figure 5.11: Illustration of quantization noise
Based on this vulnerability analysis, we chose the dither QIM method to enhance
the sensor data integrity verification process. In dither modulation based QIM, dif-
ferent factors such as the dither range (DR) and the sample length of embedded
message sequence determine the tamper detection and localization accuracies of the
framework. We deduce the optimal values of those parameters and discuss the trade-
offs between the channel noise tolerance and the tamper detection and localization
accuracy using LiDAR sensor data.
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5.6.1 Countermeasure Framework
To overcome the security vulnerabilities of the countermeasure framework pro-
posed in section 5.4, we propose a more secured quantization method called spread
3D dither QIM. In this new approach, which is a combination of cryptography and
watermarking, the initial handshake between the sensor and the central ADAS unit
relies on symmetric or asymmetric cryptography to transmit embedded message se-
quences and other data hiding parameters. As shown in the sequence diagram of
Figure 5.12. After this initial data exchange, the sensor transmits the 3D dither
modulated frames to the ADAS unit. The ADAS unit can directly work on these
frames as the embedding induced distortion is minimal and does not affect the in-
ference engine. In parallel, the decoding algorithms extract the embedded data to
detect and localize the tampered area in the data frame. The data validity flag would
indicate further applications to use or ignore that particular data from the sensor.
5.6.1.1 Dither Modulation
In the proposed method based on the dither modulation to embed a binary mes-




















, d0 < 0
d0 − ∆2 , d0 > 0
(5.6)
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In Equation (5.6) the dither value d0 is pseudo-randomly chosen over a uniform
Figure 5.12: Sequence diagram of proposed method




], for a given step size ∆. With this
embedding mechanism, the data hiding technique cannot be easily reverse-engineered
even when the embedding message scheme is compromised. The quantized signal
value is represented as (Bitar et al., 2015)
xq = x+ (Qm(x,∆)− x) m ∈ {0, 1} (5.7)
The extraction of embedded message md is performed using the minimum distance
decoder such as
md =m∈0,1 |xq −Qm(x,∆)| (5.8)
Applying the dither QIM approach to 3D QIM, the embedding region becomes a
hyper-cube, and the set of points obtained by perturbing the center of the hyper-
cube to all possible vertices are given by a coset vector (Wenjun et al., 2006). These
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coset vectors for a 3D QIM can be represented as S0, · · · , S7
Wi,j,k =
























In Equation (5.9), Wi,j,k represents embedded message symbol value at a given 3D
voxel centeroid of the point cloud represented by its x, y, z position. In 3D QIM the
message symbol can contain up to three bits and the numeric values of message m
can be in range m ∈ {0, . . . , 7}. For the voxelized LiDAR data, the dither modulation
would move the voxel centeroid based on the embedding message sequence as shown
in Figure 5.13 In the spread 3D QIM method, each message symbol is embedded into
Figure 5.13: Voxel centeroid movement due to dither modulation
the host signal vector for a length of (L) samples. The advantage of this spread is
the spread of the distortion across groups of samples that increases the embedded
message extraction accuracy.
5.6.1.2 Watermark Generation
The watermark used in this method is a numeric sequence m ∈ {0 · · · 7} that is
generated based on a random seed. The exchange of the watermark message sequence
and the dither modulation parameters can happen one time during the sensor initial-
ization on power-up through asymmetric cryptographic encoding. Also, to further
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fortify the system, these parameters could be exchanged between the sensor and re-
ceiver at random time intervals to reduce further the chances of a man in the middle
attack where the hacker learns the watermark sequence.
5.6.1.3 Watermark Embedding
For embedding the hidden message into the LiDAR point cloud using the pro-
posed spread 3D dither QIM, first, the LiDAR data frame is quantized into voxels as
explained in section 5.4. For a given frame if LFvl denotes the LiDAR frame voxel
length, a message with a symbol length msl ≤ LFvl is selected. This message can be
ciphered by applying the XOR operation and a secret key or any other cryptographic
algorithm. Each symbol of the cipher message, which is represented by 3 bits, is
embedded into a group of L voxels (L ≥ 1) in the LiDAR frame. In this process, each
bit of the three-bit message symbol is embedded into the (x, y, z) coordinates of the
voxel centroid, as shown in Equation (5.9).
To embed a message string of length k, into a host signal x with L samples at a
time, we need k×L voxels. If L is chosen to be say six, then to embed three message
symbols we need eighteen voxels as shown Figure 5.14. Each bit of the encoded
message is inserted into six samples that correspond to the (x, y, z) coordinates of the
six samples (x0, y0, z0), (x1, y1, z1), · · · , (x5, y5, z5). After the embedding process, the


















5), with each voxel centeroid
moved by a dither value within a hypercube of size ∆/2. The embedded message can
be extracted using the Equation (5.8).
Figure 5.14: Message embedding example with three bits and L= 6
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5.6.2 Experiments & Results
As discussed in section 5.5.2, the acceptable levels of watermarking induced distor-
tion in the autonomous vehicle applications, for LiDAR object detection in specific,
depends on the detection models used and their corresponding constraints. In QIM
based data hiding approach the step-size ∆ can be adjusted to produce acceptable
levels of distortion based on the choice of the detection algorithm. In the distortion
analysis presented in section 5.5.2, the maximum distance between the reconstruc-
tion points is ∆/2. Within this range, in the proposed method of 3D spread dither
QIM, we have additional parameters such as dither range (DR) and spread sample
length (L) that can affect the tamper detection accuracy and noise robustness. To
understand the effects of these parameters on the tamper detection and localization
accuracy, multiple experiments are performed to deduce values for dither-range and
spread length for a given step-size ∆. Experiments focus on three features for the
robustness analysis
• Encoding bit-error-rate (BER),
• Tamper localization accuracy, and
• Tamper detection false-negative rate fn.
These features are computed for various attack vectors in the presence of uniform
Gaussian noise. These features are tested at the noise boundary conditions such as
σ < DR and σ > DR to verify the performance of the proposed method. Also to
determine the impact of the spread of the dither modulation, multiple spread sample
lengths L are used in performing the boundary condition checks.
5.6.2.1 Dataset
The proposed method of spread dither 3D-QIM encoding and decoding is tested
on random urban driving scenario LiDAR frames from the KITTI vision benchmark
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suite. Building on top of the analysis done in section 5.5.3.2 to choose the appropriate
step-size to reduce the QIM embedded distortion, here, we focus on methods to further
secure the encoding mechanism and understand the trade-offs in implementing those
methods.
5.6.2.2 Bit Error Rate
In this experiment, the BER is measured by comparing the embedded mes-
sage bitstream messageembedd with the decoded message bitstreams messagedecode.
The number of mismatches errorbits are divided by the length of the bitstream
len(messagedecode) to get the rate of error as per Equation (4.22). Varying levels
of uniform noise is added to the embedded frames, and BER values are measured
at different spread sample lengths (L). It is observed that the BER values increased
with the increase in the dither range (DR) values irrespective of the sample length.
For a given step size ∆, the BER values are higher when the dither range nears the
max values ±∆/2. As the dither range values get lower, the BER values improve
and get below the 2% range for higher sample length spread. This trend persists
even when the added noise variance σ is greater than the QIM toleration theoretical
toleration limit shown in Equation (4.7) Figure 5.15-5.17 show the average bit error
rate values calculated by the counter framework pipeline at different spread lengths
L and dither ranges DR.
5.6.2.3 Localization Accuracy
The LiDAR frames once encoded with the proposed method of spread dither 3D
QIM method, are tampered with the attack vectors in this experiment. The accuracy
with which the proposed method localizes the tampered area in the tampered LiDAR
frames is estimated by calculating the Hausdorff distances between the 3D bounding
boxes encompassing the tampered area and the corresponding ground truth bounding
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Figure 5.15: Bit Error Rate at ∆ = 5cm, σ = 0.0
Figure 5.16: Bit Error Rate at ∆ = 5cm, σ = 0.0072
boxes.
These calculations are repeated for multiple data frames with additional uniform
noise for a given step-size ∆ = 5 cm. It is observed that the localization accuracy
is in general low for higher dither ranges ±∆/2 at all spread lengths. As the dither
range decreases, the spread length values in the extremes still show lower accuracy.
The optimum spread lengths for accurate localization of tamper are {8, 16, 32} at
the dither ranges {∆/4,∆/8} for clean LiDAR frames without added noise. Here as
the dither range goes above ∆/4, the probability of decoding the wrong voxel vertex
increases. Though the spread should decrease this error by increasing the number of
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Figure 5.17: Bit Error Rate at ∆ = 5cm, σ = 0.0144
occurrences, in this particular use case with the tamper points covering 10% of the
total frame length which is around ∼ 30K voxels, the experiments show that having
a spread length of > 10% of the tamper points results in inaccurate localization of
the tampering.
As the noise, σ increases, the acceptable localization accuracy levels are achieved
at the lower dither ranges ∆/8 and the sample lengths of {16} or ∼ 5% of total sample
points seem to be the optimum length for spread. This analysis provides an important
insight into the selection of dither ranges and spread lengths for autonomous vehicle
applications. The theoretical tolerance for QIM at a given step size is given by
Equation (4.7). The dither range that falls within this range is {∆/8}, and even
within this range, the optimum length of the spread for the localization accuracy is
deduced to be ∼ 5%.
Figure 5.18-5.20 show the average localization distortion values calculated by the
counter framework pipeline at different spread lengths and dither ranges.
5.6.2.4 False Negatives
In this experiment, the number of tampered LiDAR frames that escaped the
detection pipeline is estimated. The two main issues with probabilistic functions
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Figure 5.18: Localization distortion at ∆ = 5cm, σ = 0.0
Figure 5.19: Localization distortion at ∆ = 5cm, σ = 0.0072
Figure 5.20: Localization distortion at ∆ = 5cm, σ = 0.0144
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Figure 5.21: Detection False Negatives at ∆ = 5cm, σ = 0.0
Figure 5.22: Detection False Negatives at ∆ = 5cm, σ = 0.0072
are false alarms, both positive and negative. In the case of sensor frame integrity
checks, the false negatives cause more damage than false-positives. Any frame that
is tampered and goes undetected by the system is not acceptable for our application.
To get this value, both tampered and clean frames are given as input to the spread
dither QIM pipeline.
To measure the false-alarms or the number of frames that are clean, but our
algorithm flags them as tampered. The false-negative rate (fn) is calculated as the
ratio of number of tampered frames that are falsely determined as clean by the pipeline
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Figure 5.23: Detection False Negatives at ∆ = 5cm, σ = 0.0144
(NfalseClean) to total number of tampered frames(Ntampered) given as
fn = NfalseClean/Ntampered (5.10)
It is observed that the false-negative rate is close to 0% for dither range ±∆/2,
for lower dither ranges, it is low for lower spread lengths and drastically increases
for higher spread lengths. Figure 5.21-5.23 show the average false negative values




Future Work & Conclusion
In this chapter, we look into the future prospects of extending the research and
provide concluding remarks on the work that has been done. When it comes to future
work ideas, there are two different areas into which the research can be extended. One
of them is to build a generic watermarking based data integrity framework to deal
with different data transactions occurring in the automotive domain. The second idea
is to extract the sensor-specific fingerprint and use it to build a security framework
that can stop regular channel and the transmission channel attacks on the sensor
data.
6.1 Need for Data Security in Autonomous Vehicles
Sensor data importance in modern cars and its integrity verification methods using
cryptography alternatives like watermarking is discussed extensively in earlier chap-
ters. Data transactions are happening all over the place in a modern car. Advances
in driver assistance, automated driving, infotainment, and comfort features such as
customization based on biometric sensors, etc are accounting for data generation and
data transfers (Stanely, 2015). Along with individual vehicle generated data, the in-
crease in connected vehicle technology such as 5G C2X and V2I/V2X where vehicles
form clusters and share the data with vehicles inside the clusters is a growing trend.
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According to a Gartner report, by 2022 the majority of premium segment cars would
be offering connected vehicle services. With an average sensor set count of around
200 sensors measuring different data from the cars such as vehicle usage, vehicle en-
vironment, and driver biometrics, etc. a modern car acts like a high-end edge system
with constant connectivity to the cloud and other vehicles in the vicinity (TE
Connectivity, 2018). Along with the onboard sensing, these real-time communications
with other vehicles and infrastructure help the cars to build temporal databases that
help them with developing predictive route planning. All these on-board, off-board
data transactions, flows need to be secured not only to provide safe and secured func-
tionality but also to protect the data generator’s intellectual property and protect
them from false claims of liability. The cryptography based techniques can be of help
to protect the integrity of the data to an extent but the end to end traceability of the
data can only be achieved when we combine cryptography with watermarking.
To train the deep learning models that are used to make some automated driving
decisions, data is collected from the real road driving of the vehicles. Companies
spend huge amount of money to set-up vehicles, do test drives and to collect the
drive data. Heavy load processing servers are used to store and retrieve the scenario
information from these road runs. This data is accessed by engineers to train the
models locally or on the cloud, some times the data is used to analyze the scenario
better, to annotate it so the deep learning algorithm can be trained. The data trans-
actions from the vehicle to cloud and cloud to local machines are secured but once
the data is downloaded to a local node, it loses the security shield. With the current
trend of remote working, there is no secure way to make sure that the data doesn’t
end up with some competitor who could use it to his advantage or train his models
without having to spend money in collecting it. Watermarking can help answer most
of the traceability, leakage control, access control questions. One of the growing re-
search areas of watermarking is to bring it to the cutting edge technologies and as a
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part of this research applying watermarking to real-time communications also needs
to be researched. The time it takes to embed and extract a watermark along with
its optimum performance is crucial when bringing this technology to real-time data
transfers. In the above scenario embedding the vehicle data with a watermark before
it gets uploaded to the cloud would provide end-to-end traceability but given the sce-
nario where each vehicle is generating GigaBytes of data every hour, the time budget
of watermark embedding, packetizing the data, and transporting becomes crucial. A
robust watermarking scheme that can embed large volumes of data in such a short
time is still a matter of research.
6.1.1 Data Sources
A McKinsey report states that current day cars have the compute power of 20
modern PCs, process about 25 GB of data/hr and contains around 100 million lines of
code. Autonomous vehicles in particular are considered as supercomputers rolling on
the highways, generating around 5 TB of data per hour, necessitating the need to split
the data processing between the cloud and the edge which is the vehicle. Doing simple
math, these mind-boggling data numbers can be easily proved. At a standard 30 fps
data rate, a single video camera generates about 300 GB of data an hour for 720-pixel
video and this number can creep up-to 5.4 TB for a 4K video resolution (Miller, 2020).
Now consider an autonomous car, there are multiple sets of such cameras, along with
other high data generators like a LiDAR and RADARS, etc. Many algorithms process
this data in real-time and make self-driving decisions and some of the data is sent
to the cloud for storage and post-processing and deep learning algorithm scenario
training. Along with the sensor data the vehicles need to store and retrieve HD map
data to help them identify the road boundaries, guard rails medians at centimeter-
level accuracy. Along with the sensor data that senses the environment, a vehicle also
carries many internal sensors to monitor its performance, this information needs to
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be sent to the cloud as-well to support few specific applications. Many applications
also require sensors to monitor human drivers, their cognitive distractions, and their
ability to take over the vehicle in scenarios where the vehicle cannot drive by itself.
These sensors collect data that need to be sent to the cloud for logging. Other
customer convenience features also require the vehicle to collect driver information
to customize the vehicle to his needs like setting the vehicle environment to driver
needs.
6.1.2 Framework Proposal
We see that there is a need to bring in end-to-end transaction traceability, access
control into data transactions in the automotive domain and this can be done with
the help of watermarking techniques. We want to propose a generic framework to
watermark any data contained in an automotive domain. If we consider the data
that is collected by the sensors for the autonomous driving use case, it is estimated
that around 30% of the data collected by the vehicle is will be uploaded to the cloud
by every car. This accounts for the rest of 70% of the data to be processed in real-
time by the vehicle or the edge node. The data that gets uploaded goes through lossy
compression. Handing this data needs changes both in the cloud infrastructure as well
as edge computing. Many interesting research problems such as how to manage the
data storage and retrieval with low latencies, content and scenario mining, exchange
of the data securely with different stakeholders, etc. arise as the companies start
building the drive database. Here we present the high-level overview and try to
provide a direction to future research in the area of data integrity and traceability.
To solve this problem, we first need to identify at what stage of this data flow
process we can embed the watermark and what is the best strategy to embed the
watermark.
If we take the general case of video data encryption, the mechanism chosen to
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Figure 6.1: Data-transactions in modern-vehicles and watermarking framework pro-
posal
encrypt the data where it is block cipher based or stream-based, etc. depends on
the underlying universal coding standard that the video has to adhere to. In our
use case, we do not have any format compliance or transcodability restrictions as the
data compression strategy can be unique to a specific organization. Based on the data
density, timing, and bandwidth requirements, they can make some design choices like
partial encryption, encryption before or after compression, etc. but encryption and
compression can be considered as inevitable steps in the data that gets transmitted
to the cloud. We view adding watermarking to this equation would complement
the cryptography and provides extended protection to the content even after the
decryption. Now the question comes when should the data be watermarked.
Here there can be three choices to embed a watermark, pre-encryption, and com-
pression, based on the robustness of the watermark, the watermarking could get
altered or removed during the compression step. Inter-encryption and compression,
here we find an appropriate step like quantization of the bitstream to embed the
watermark during the compression and finally the post-encryption and compression,
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again here application based careful consideration is required (Bohó et al., 2013).
From these three choices, based on the computational power distribution and the
time complexity we suggest going with the pre-compression and encryption stage for
the watermark encryption. This method has a couple of advantages.
1. The data that doesn’t get uploaded to the cloud can also benefit from the
integrity checks as mentioned in this research
2. The watermark embedding burden is distributed among different sensors or
the data origin locations so it’s faster to encode and the concept of real-time
watermarking can be achieved
The watermarking scheme we propose is the one that has high imperceptibility and
can be universally applied to any type of data. QIM and its variants are primary
candidates to investigate but this area can be researched to find any other spatial
domain variants of the watermarking that fit the bill.
The next crucial step is to find the embedding location selection. By location, we
mean wherein the data generation process we want to embed the watermark. Here
we want to explore a universally applicable area. The embedding location should be
data-independent, in the sense it should apply to all forms of data whether it is a
raw video captured by high definition cameras or images or the 3D point cloud of the
environment captured by a LIDAR or even a 1D time series captured by a biometric
sensor, we should be able to apply the watermark universally. Here, without loss of
generality, we can assume that any data generated from the vehicle is a set of pack-
etized data. This assumption gives us the ability to apply the same watermarking
technique at every vehicle data origin. If we look at data as the application-specific
streams like frames for video, 3D point cloud for LiDAR data, etc, the embedding
strategy must be specific to the sensor and soon the process can get clumsy with
the addition of different sensors. Also, another assumption we make is that the data
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generation nodes are connected to the vehicle network over Ethernet. Needless to
say that Ethernet is becoming the major automotive network backbone. Most of
the sensor manufacturers are also migrating to this network to support the band-
width requirements. With this assumption, the proposal is to embed a watermark in
different layers of the networking model as shown in Figure 6.2. Based on how we
design the gateway modules and hopping networks within the vehicle, the embedded
watermark can be stripped and re-assigned or it can be directly forwarded to the
destination node depending on the layer in which the watermark is embedded. Also,
to let the watermark stay beyond the network transactions, the watermark needs to
be randomly embedded into the user data itself as a data element. In (Artru et al.,
2019) multiple locations to embed the watermark in-network headers are discussed,
such as
• Physical layer embedding: At this level, the data bits are arranged as bit 
frames before getting transmitted as a signal on the Ethernet bus. This layer 
can be used to embed data by using spread spectrum techniques as discussed 
in (Li et al., 2013).
• Storage channel embedding: The storage channel watermarking exploits the 
redundancies and the unused fields of the multi-layer Ethernet stack shown in 
Figure 6.2. In (Kundur and Ahsan., 2003), a method to store a bit per datagram 
by modifying the 3-bit flag bit in the IP header. Similarly, making use of the 
Time to Live, TCP sequence numbers, packet length alterations, and checksum 
packets are discussed in (Collins and Agaian, 2016).
• Timing channels: Using the time sync modules to hide and forward the wa-
termark between two endpoints is discussed in (Houmansadr et al., 2009). One 
such simple method is modifying the inter-packet Delay (IPD) to embed the wa-
termark. There are also methods to exploit the TCP segment temporal bursts
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(Luo et al., 2008).
• Application protocols: Many applications are built on the top of the network
stack such as FTP, SMTP, HTTP, SSH, etc. The choice of which is dependent on
the end application. These applications can have an optional header file that can
be added to the user data and this can be used to embed the watermark. Several
methods like using secret fields to inform receivers that the MAC contains the
watermark as discussed in (Lucena et al., 2005). The works that mention ways to
embed the watermark in the spaces included in HTTP headers reveal that there
exist multiple locations to store a cleverly crafted watermark in any application.
• User data: Given the packet size of an Ethernet frame, many watermark
embedding schemes like the addition of watermark to the packet data at random
locations can be explored. This method has the advantage that the watermark
stays with the data beyond the data stripping realm of the network.
Figure 6.2: OSI model of an Ethernet frame
The proposed framework can make use of spatial domain watermarking methods like
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the QIM and can be worked on as an extension to the concepts verified in this work. As
shown in Figure 6.1, the framework can be divided into different areas like watermark
embedding method selection where you decide the best approach to insert watermark
into the data, then decide the watermark location like where int e network layer you
want to insert the watermark and what type of data you want to watermark. Here
the autonomous car collects data from on-board sensors, external entities like other
vehicles, map servers, etc. This data gets watermarked at the source and then can be
consumed within the vehicle or the edge for real-time data interpretation or can be
uploaded to the cloud after compression. After the extraction process, the data can
be used for post-processing like deep learning model training or sharing with multiple
stakeholders or within the vehicle where the watermark will be still in the dormant
state ready to be retrieved if required.
6.2 Sensor Fingerprints
As the market for autonomous vehicles advances, a need for robust safety protocols
also increases. Autonomous vehicles rely on sensors to understand their operating
environment. Active sensors such as cameras, LiDAR, ultrasonic, and radar are
vulnerable to regular channel attacks. One way to counter these attacks is to pattern
match the sensor data with its unique physical distortions, commonly referred to as a
fingerprint. This fingerprint exists because of how the sensor was manufactured, and
it can be used to determine the transmitting sensor from the received waveform.
Fingerprints are formed due to microscopic imperfections and dissimilarities in the
sensor manufacturing process. They are physical features prevalent in a multitude
of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) and other hardware devices that arise in specific
waveform characteristics. Sensor fingerprints can be represented as a function of the
material properties which make up a sensor or a piece of hardware and fabrication pro-
cess. These imperfections are assumed to be unique to a specific sensor and random.
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The concept of physical fingerprinting has been used for RF transmitter identifica-
tion (Deng et al., 2017) and hardware validation for sensors used in non-automotive
applications (Ahmed et al., 2020). In this study, we focus on extracting sensor in-
trinsic properties called fingerprints that can serve as a potential countermeasure
for two physical signal level attacks, which are attacks categorized by manipulating
the environment in such a way to cause incorrect ultrasonic sensor measurements.
Using an ultrasonic sensor, we establish that there exists a specific distortion profile
in the transmitted waveform called physical fingerprint that can be attributed to their
intrinsic characteristics. In the case of ultrasonic sensors, this fingerprint manifests
in the form of random noise in the transmitted pulse sequence from the sensor which
can be observed in the sensor transmissions.
We propose a joint time-frequency analysis-based framework for ultrasonic sensor
fingerprint extraction and use it as a feature to train a Naive Bayes classifier. The
trained model is used for transmitter identification from the received physical wave-
form. In the future, this proposed framework can be extended using a simple or deep
learning-based classifier to identify its signature in the returns and reject data from
an attacker.
Figure 6.3: Block-diagram of the system model
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6.2.1 Methodology
We propose a method to extract the sensor fingerprints by observing the spec-
trogram for each sensor at multiple distances to determine each sensor’s respective
resonance frequency Figure 6.5. Once we have determined the resonance frequency
for a sensor, our algorithm extracts data from the necessary frequencies which will
create a frequency profile used for training our classifier. By applying a band-pass
filter to our data, our classifier ignores irrelevant data and is in turn more accurate.
Each frequency bin in our spectrogram over the desired interval acts as a feature
vector later for our classifier and essentially contains the fingerprinting information
of a given sensor. As mentioned, pattern matching a fingerprint to a specific sensor
based on spectral content is extremely robust, since it is infeasible for an attacker to
generate and transmit an ultrasonic waveform with the same fingerprint or random
noise profile, even if the attacker has a sophisticated knowledge of our implementa-
tion. Here, we train a simple, computationally light machine learning model with
this feature to demonstrate that the transmitting sensor can be identified through a
physical fingerprint.
6.2.2 System Model
The system model assumes an ultrasonic sensor system on chip devices commonly
used in automotive applications (Texas Instruments, 2014). The sensor does the signal 
conditioning and processing for the transducer echo signals and transmits the distance
to the obstacle and other parameters over the chosen interface like CAN, LIN. The
on-board ECU allows complete configurability for the end applications.
The proposed fingerprint extraction happens on the sensor itself, during an initial
calibration phase where the sensor learns the fingerprint and trains a model to identify
its echo and differentiate it from others. This model can be used at a later stage to
identify if the sensor is under attack. Shown in Figure 6.3 is the block diagram of the
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Figure 6.4: Spectrograms of sensor transmissions generated using 8 ms window size,
25% overlap, and Hanning weight window
system model. During the calibration phase, the system learns its echo and trains
the model which is then used to determine the authenticity of the received signal.
Specifically, the received signal is analyzed for fingerprint extraction in the background
while the data gets processed to detect obstacles. The output from the sensor includes
a validity flag along with the data to assure that the data is authentic and not subject
to physical attacks. In the proposed framework, we use power spectrum coefficients as
features and a simple Gaussian Naive Bayes classifier to perform supervised learning
and classification of labeled data. As the Naive Bayes classifier supports multi-class
classification, it will not only allow our system to accurately detect when an attack
occurs but also on what sensor, since most vehicles that utilize ultrasonic sensors use
more than one.
Our system for combating attacks launched by the adversary is under the assump-
tion that the time in which we detect an attack is not a leading factor in the success
of our model. In real-time applications, ADAS systems have stringent safety require-
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ments such as brake engagement that have a maximum latency of 0.1 seconds (Lin
et al., 2018).
6.2.3 Data Model
Our data model assumes that the data inputs have the following characteristics as
noted in (Xu et al., 2018) except we define the transmitted and received signals with
the inclusion of noise characteristics emitted by the transducer due to a hardware
fingerprint. We can describe the transmitted waveform of our ultrasonic sensor as an
ideal sinusoidal signal
s(t) = A cos(ωct), tε[0,∞] (6.1)
Where in Equation (6.1), A is the amplitude of the signal, t is the time and ωc is the
radial frequency of the carrier signal. In reality, the transmitted signal will have some
noise component to it as a result of the hardware fingerprint
sr(t) = A cos(ωct) + nr(t), tε[0,∞] (6.2)
Where in Equation (6.2), nr(t) denotes the noise of the transmitted signal due to the
hardware fingerprint. At the receiver, the transmitted signal appears as
r(t) = α cos((ωct+ ωD)(t− τ) + θ) + nr(t) + n(t), tε[0,∞] (6.3)
Where in Equation (6.3), α represents the attenuated amplitude of the transmitted
signal, ωD is the Doppler velocity, τ is the time delay (time for the echoed signal to
reach the receiver), θ is the phase shift, and n(t) is the additive noise component. We
expect nr(t) to be centered at the resonance frequency of our sensors since ultrasonic
sensors transmit pulses by exciting a piezoelectric transducer (Hagood and von Flo-
tow, 1991). This transducer will vibrate acoustically at the same frequency as the AC
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voltage that is applied to it. Noise due to microscopic hardware imperfections will be
exacerbated around the resonance frequency of the sensor. Signals of this type will
be analyzed and used as input to our classifier.
Figure 6.5: Power spectrum of sensors under test at 25 cm distance measurement
6.2.4 Threat Model
While evaluating the security of our model, it is important first to identify what
possible adversaries we must defend against and what types of attacks they can
employ. We identified these main physical channel attacks on the ultrasonic sensors.
It is assumed that the attacker will be able to perform these three types of attacks
and for launching these attacks, the assumption is made that the attacker will have
a know-how of all the information of our system, such as what sensors are used,
the frequency at which data is recorded, and even our method for defending against
malicious attacks.
1. Jamming Attacks : The attacker will be able to perform jamming attacks (Li
et al., 2007), where the transducer of an ultrasonic sensor is always excited with
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ultrasound in such a way that it cannot measure the echo of its transmitted
ultrasonic waves and therefore cannot accurately perceive its surroundings.
2. Spoofing Attacks : The attacker will be able to generate ultrasonic pulses to
excite the transducer of an ultrasonic sensor such that a ”phantom object” can
be perceived by the sensor when it is not truly there. This is the case when
an ultrasonic wave is spoofed to the transducer of an ultrasonic sensor before
the echo of its transmitted wave can return, resulting in the sensor perceiving
a non-existent object. Although this is difficult to perform while a sensor is
in motion due to timing dependencies, it has been implemented on stationary
sensors used in automobiles in (Chen. Yan, 2016) in the case where the attacker
has knowledge of the frequency of ultrasonic sensor readings, which fits this
threat model.
3. Sensor Damage & Replacement : In addition to jamming and spoofing attacks,
the adversary may also perform an attack that requires physical contact with
the sensor. This is the case when the adversary damages (Elvin et al., 2003)
the sensor or replaces it entirely. It is assumed that the adversary can do this
stealthily, such that visually it is not possible to tell whether or not a sensor
has been physically damaged, replaced, or altered in any way.
The proposed framework can handle jamming and spoofing attacks along with the
sensor damage contact-based attacks. Since we assume a smart sensor that runs
the data-processing on-board, we cannot detect the sensor replacement contact-based
attack.
6.2.5 Fingerprint Extraction
To extract and localize the hardware-specific fingerprints, we chose the time-
frequency analysis method. As spectrograms give the time-frequency distribution
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of time series data, we started with spectrogram analysis of the sensors under test.
In Figure 6.4, the spectrograms of the five sensors under test are shown. With the
reduced window size of 8 ms, the frequency distribution of each sensor is visually
distinguishable, although minutely, and laid the first step towards our claim towards
the presence of an intrinsic sensor fingerprint. As a next step, we focused on the
spectral components at a central frequency of operation of the sensors. We obtained
the power spectrum of the ultrasonic sensor signal around the operating frequency of
40 kHz with a timing resolution of 250 ms and a frequency resolution of 1 kHz. The
power spectrum is generated with a persistence option to visualize the percentage of
time that a particular frequency component is present in the input signal. The results
as shown in Figure 6.5, display a distinct feature in the form of the power spectrum
peak location that can be used to identify each sensor. The power spectrum peak
and the corresponding peak shape profile occurred at different frequencies for different
sensors under test. It can be observed from the Figure 6.5, that the spectral peaks
for sensors under test, A,B,C,D & E occurred at 40.91, 40.36, 40.45, 41.03, 40.65
kHz respectively. The peak locations of any two sensors were separated with a 100
Hz frequency resolution and the peak roll-off rates for different sensors are different
as-well. Given the fact that our sensors under test are from the same manufacturer,
of the same grade and data collection conditions are the same across multiple exper-
iment runs, the variation in the location of the peak for power spectral components
can be considered as a unique fingerprint for each sensor. We used this variation
in the peak location and the shape profile information as our main feature for the
classification of the sensors. Though it can be argued that as the number of sensors
increases drastically the frequency resolution might not be sufficient to distinguish
different sensors based on just the spectral peak location, for our end application of
supporting Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS) or Automated Driving (AD)
features, the number of ultrasonic sensors used in a vehicle is usually less than 15. For
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Figure 6.6: Power spectrum of all sensors under test at different distances
instance, Tesla autopilot advanced sensor coverage has 12 ultrasonic sensors (Tesla,
2020). We observed similar trends in power spectrum peak location and shape profile
at different distances as shown in Figure 6.6. The power spectrum visualization in
Figure 6.6 shown in a table form with each row displaying the power spectra of a
single sensor collected at different distances and similarly the columns represent the
power spectra of different sensors at a given distance. While the peak location was a
good feature to classify different sensors at a given distance it did not generate good
results for distance agnostic sensor classification. It can be observed that for distance
agnostic sensor classification feature the peak roll-off rate and the shape profiles need
to be used and modeled. This is considered a future extension of this research.
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6.2.6 Experiments & Results
The first step in building a system model to counter the physical attacks on an
ultrasonic sensor is to establish that different ultrasonic sensors generate fingerprints
in their transmissions unique to the host and this fingerprint can be used to identify
the host sensor. To prove this point, we set-up an experiment as shown in Figure 6.7.
The microphone placed at various distances from an ultrasonic sensor captures the
sensor transmissions and records them.
Figure 6.7: Data collection set-up for fingerprint extraction
This recorded data is then used to generate feature vectors from spectrograms.
After generating the scattering features for each ultrasonic sensor under test, the
Gaussian Naive Bayes model is trained with the training dataset. The Gaussian
Naive Bayes classifier also had promising results as shown in Table 6.1. Data used
from the same experiment is shown in Figure 6.7. was input to our classifier. One
benefit of the Gaussian NB method is that only 10 percent of the data was needed
for training to achieve high accuracy classification.
As an extension, we decided to synthetically saturate the received signal of our
ultrasonic sensor by adding a percentage of the peak noise values seen graphically
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Distance (cm) Training Size Test Size Accuracy
25 10% 90% 99.67%
50 10% 90% 96.68%
75 10% 90% 95.42%
100 10% 90% 99.66%
Mixed Distances 10% 90% 91.72%
Table 6.1: Accuracy: Gaussian NaiveBayes Method
in Figure 6.4 as a DC component to the signal before the spectrogram is applied.
By synthetically adding Gaussian white noise (Simon, 2002), the discernibly of the
fingerprint was diminished. The goal of this was to experiment with pseudo-jamming
to see at what point our classifier would no longer be able to successfully identify a
sensor. To recursively add noise until the fingerprint was no longer identifiable, we
let the amount of saturation be proportional to some value of the peak value.
Nr[n] = x[n] + ασxN [n] (6.4)
Where x(n) is the received digital signal,σx is the standard deviation of the original
signal, α is a saturation coefficient and N [n] is a noise signal with standard normal
mean and standard deviation and Nr[n] is our total saturation which is added to the
entire time-domain signal. Figure 6.8 shows the effect different values of α have on the
spectrum of the received signal. The classifier performed reasonably well for
Figure 6.8: Saturation of received signal - Spectrogram visual
values of 0 ≤ α ≤ 0.539. The Table 6.2 below shows the accuracy of the classifier f or 
different values of α for a single sensor
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Mixed Distances 0.2154 91.72%
Table 6.2: Accuracy: Saturated Gaussian NaiveBayes Method
This framework of fingerprint extraction can be combined with watermarking to
build an end-to-end sensor security system that can work against regular channel and
transmission channel attacks.
6.3 Conclusion
In this research, we presented the watermarking methods to deal with the insider
attacks on the sensor data that pose a real threat to autonomous vehicles. A Cyber-
physical system, such as an autonomous vehicle, is susceptible to insider attacks
targeting sensors and their transmission channels, making it necessary to verify the
integrity of sensor data before acting on it. Traditional data integrity protection
methods like cryptography cannot be applied in their entirety to solve this problem
due to their resource requirements and complexity. In chapters 2 & 3 we presented
an overview of the watermarking methods. In chapter 4, we proposed a 2D QIM for
watermarking the RADAR data and proposed a pipe-line to design watermarks when
dealing with smart sensors. This pipeline is tested for the effects of embedding induced
distortion using simulated RADAR data on an EKF based sensor fusion algorithm.
The experimental results conclude that that the 2D QIM method for watermarking
has a little or no effect on the EKF predictions for small values of quantization step-
size ∆ ≤ 0.05 m, which can be attributed to the minimal distortion induced by
the 2D QIM process. In chapter 5, we proposed a novel approach to detect and
localize tampering of the raw data from the LiDAR sensor. We demonstrated that
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the proposed method can detect and localize tampering to the real-world benchmark
KITTI dataset with a 100% success rate as long as additive noise is less than the
quantization step-size. We also established the QIM embedding-induced distortion
thresholds for proper detection using 3D FCN and VoxelNet deep learning models.
We analyzed the security vulnerabilities of the plain QIM method and enhanced it
by proposing a spread dither 3D QIM method to verify the sensor data integrity. We
tested the effectiveness of the proposed method on KITTI LiDAR sensor data-set.
We deduced the optimum values of parameters for the proposed method by building
a pipe-line based on the proposed approach to detect and localize the tampering of
the raw data from the sensor.
The low complexity data hiding or watermarking techniques proposed in this
research can be applied to existing legacy interfaces without burdening the interface
bandwidth or computational resources of the system. This makes the process of
transitioning to the secured data link possible even in legacy systems. Always, having
some level of security in place is still better than having none. Having sensor data
integrity checks in place can help to secure the applications and build safer systems.
In the security world, often a layered architecture is preferred wherein if an attack
cannot be prevented; It can be detected to prevent the worst outcome. We believe
that watermarking the sensor data adds another layer to the security scheme using
some light-weight and yet efficient techniques. These techniques can be used either in
a standalone mode or in conjunction with traditional cryptography methods wherever
necessary, to secure data transfers over any physical interface such as CAN/CAN-FD,
Ethernet, etc.
We also presented the future directions to the research. This research can be
extended to designing a universal framework to provide integrity verification and
traceability to different data transactions in the automotive domain. Also, we pro-
pose to exploit the unique watermarks for sensors by extracting the sensor intrinsic
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distortions or fingerprints that can be successfully used to identify them. The pro-
posed frameworks can be extended to different sensor modalities, different watermark
embedding methods along with the study to find out the effects of embedding induced
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All the git repositories used for the development of source code for this research
are made public.
1. 2D QIM implementation for RADAR sensor from Chapter 4, can be found in
the following github location (Changalvala et al., 2020)
https://github.com/raghu429/RADAR DataIntegrity.git
2. 3D QIM implementation for LiDAR sensor from Chapter 5, can be found in the
following github location (Changalvala and Malik, 2019b), (Changalvala and
Malik, 2019a)
https://github.com/raghu429/LiDAR QIM.git
3. 3D Dither QIM implementation for LiDAR sensor from Chapter 5, can be found
in the following github location (Changalvala and Malik, 2020)
https://github.com/raghu429/DitherQIM.git
4. Fingerprint generation for Ultrasonic sensor from Chapter 6, can be found in
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